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The Folds of History. The Transformation of the Memory of World War II in the Era of Globalization

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Let me open my presentation concerning the perpetual changing image of WWII in an increasingly globalizing world with some general, however epistemologically important remarks about the meaning and validity of history and moral judgment, especially the possible nexus between them. As we know, history and historical judgments are closely bound up with the formation of the Western canon in the era of Enlightenment. Then the concept of history emerged in its newly valid meaning as a “collective singular”(Reinhardt Koselleck). It takes on the character of a concept of societal movement and especially the acceleration of time, associated with a sort of teleologically imbued horizon of anticipation - the narration of progress as the expression of secularized expectations for redemption at its heart (Karl Löwith). Such a concept of history is suspect due to the universality it lays claim to. That also holds true for a variety of other concepts of interpreting and understanding which sprang from the Western canon of experience and reflection. Especially suspicious in this relation is the attempt to generalize a world of historical images, comparisons and analogies and their proper semantics relaying on this canon while claiming general, universal validity.

In order to scrutinize into the query of the universal validity of the nexus of historical experience and moral judgment, I would like to unfold my presentation in two major steps: First to introduce the temporal angle of perception and understanding; secondly to present different, even a juxtaposed historical perspectives of WWII, probably opposing the European, the Western view. This perspective might be denominated as colonial or postcolonial.

The investigation stems from a sense of consciousness emerging in a time of an emerging global constellation, while focusing at the phenomenon of rediscovery of the Second World War with the Holocaust at its core on the one hand – and its surprising decline or expected deconstruction on the other. All this happens to happen in a quite short span of time of some 25 years. In order to grasp this paradox of entangling modes of actualization as well as those of de-actualization, it is essential to call to mind and reflect the fundamental global transformations in material life-worlds as well as in perception, which appear to have brought about such deeply entrenched changes in historical understanding. Imperative is first and foremost a proper view into the fabric of incubation, situated at the threshold of the epoch and open to the future –

stretching from the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union on to the watershed of 9-11.

The Second World War is inscribed with the importance of a seminal event of a shattered modernity. Although this attribute is traditionally ascribed more to World War I (George Kennan's seminal catastrophe), and likewise so in Anglo-Saxon tradition of historical interpretation, its very core became only realized at a greater distance: the importance and impact of the Holocaust as an epistemic crisis, and this in particular – and possibly solely for Western consciousness. In contrast with and beyond the military actions proper, i.e. in the shadow of war, something seemed to have happened which repudiated the civilizational certainties anchored in Western experience and its canon of self-reflection. This holds true in any case for the historical and philosophical diagnoses of the time in the period immediately following the war, relaying without alternative on the fundamental assurances of Enlightenment while approving their refutation. (Horkheimer/ Adorno, Arendt).

The surfacing and iconic appearance of the Holocaust to center stage out of the primary complex of the military theatre of World War Two, its outstanding state of importance as an emblematic macro-event of the 20th century, is of course the result of a retrospective glance emerging at a far later juncture. The entire emergence of the Holocaust as the ultimate genocide evidently became truly possible only when the Cold War, understood as an era of neutralization while impacting on the memories of the past in consequence of the nuclear threat of the apocalypse of total destruction of humankind in its totality, waned away. A pending future homicide blurred, yes even obstructed the view of the previous ultimate genocide. This tendency in perception of the past, neutralizing as well memories of WWII, was intensified by the dominance of social semantics in the interpretation of the respective life worlds, accompanying the ideologically grounded confrontation of the two major blocs (liberal freedom vs. social equality).

That is evidently not the entire picture. Interest in the event of genocidal destruction had already been generated earlier on by trials against Nazi perpetrators that obviously impacted on public opinion, but this was yet not the expression of a ground breaking tendency in universal perception. For that reason, its notoriety was largely limited and insular. The first windows of comprehension toward a cumulative interest in "Auschwitz", capillary cracks in the fundamentals of the then current perception and understanding, could be somehow detected in the wake of détente. And with the end of the Cold War the event of the Holocaust finally emerged out of the fog of memory's neutralization into the full light of public perception.

It was not that the Second World War had not been inscribed much earlier both in consciousness and public institutions. It obviously had. Part of that arsenal of knowledge and awareness was the holding of the Nuremberg tribunal, the

passing of the UN-Declaration on Human Rights, and the Convention on Genocide. All this occurred immediately after the end of WW II and was driven by the intention to universalize those conclusions for humanity that had been drawn from the most recent events. The beginning implementation of the idea of European unification, or at least its later crystallized narrative, had indeed sprung from the catastrophe of WW II, or at least the age of the so called “European civil war.”

However, the memory of the Holocaust as an emblematic symbol of our age of destruction did not take on a salient contour until the great turning point of 1989/90. In terms of epistemology, this is bound up with the anthropological phenomenon of memory. Because as the Cold War’s frozen time began to thaw, the spatial contours of past spaces that had been stored away for decades, were laid bare. With the return of historical spaces this very fusion activated, the historical times, related like a layered palimpsest with these proper spaces, were called to mind – and with these time-spaces their associated memories surfaced. This largely meant in particular a return of a variety of memories of World War Two – destructing continuously previously existing interpretive patterns as canonized in historiography and public speech. The great essentially binary historical narrative, based on the antagonism between Nazi Germany and its adversaries began to unravel into miscellaneous (hi)stories – histories that had been experienced very much indeed so from a respectively different perspective by diverse memory collectives. Prior to that, these resistive narratives had survived underground, swelling under the surface. Now they began to creep into the public sphere. This was particularly the case for the memories in former Eastern Europe, memories which had been repressed by the dominant historical narrative based on the ruling semantics of social class.

In addition, the reintroduction of private property after the collapse of the state socialist system also contributed and fostered to the emergence and a re-appropriation of memory. Restituted objects, mere material things pried out from the mass of collective property of collapsed centralized economies in the formerly political East began, at least in the countries that were Sovietized after 1944/45 in the context of the emergent restitution, to search for their former owners. The movement of things catalyzed by this search evoked the layers of the past, especially those recorded in the property register. Anthropologically the affinity of restituted property and emerging memory contributed to calling past times into present memory.

Parallel with that tendency, phenomena triggered by globalization began to impact on historical consciousness and historical understanding. By means of communication technologies cultural and political spaces previously separated from each other, were drawn into proximities unknown before, crystallizing a new world. That became possible thanks to devices that had formerly been utilized solely for military purposes, but which were now – with the looming end

of the Cold War foreshadowed in the 1986 treaty between the superpowers to drastically reduce strategic nuclear arsenals – opened to non-military commercial use (Intranet into Internet.) A virtually unlimited public space for communication and information opened up. In that space, in a virtual now, the most diverse times of experience embark on to interact and to converse. The previous dominant hierarchy of historical times, significantly stamped by the dominant impact of the Western historical understanding, its meaning and further consequences, began to forfeit impact.

Parallel with that tendency the accelerated proximity of different historical experiences the emerging discourse of universal human rights as well as the universalizing concept of genocide brought about a somehow paradigmatic shift in the understanding of atrocities, likewise blurring differences among them and tending to undermine the conceptual world for historical judgment. Without elaborating on the intersection of conceptual distinction and historical judgment it seems convincing that an event like the Holocaust, which happens to happen as a universal crime against humanity, however executed on a particular population in its entirety and this beyond conflict and warfare (a deed without a reason), could no longer sustain its distinctiveness it formerly earned against the backdrop of Enlightenment thinking and its refutation.

The intersection of the ability to distinct historically and to judge morally is situated at the very core of our query concerning the historical experience of World War Two – and this from the angle of a variety of even juxtaposed perspectives. This intersection points namely to the following question: How much historical consciousness and historical awareness should or ought to be presupposed on the basis of what history and historical narrativity provide in order to judge in line with the requirements of distinction? Or is historical thinking and its modes itself an expression of a particular canon, even if trustfully imbued with universalistic intentions? Its validity could be limited to specific spaces and times, its ability to universalize itself might prove to be restricted. This in turn will be attempted utilizing the changing spatial-temporal profile of the history of events and the meaning of WW II with the Holocaust as its core event. We will proceed from the understanding that even where the importance of that grounding event is explicitly denied, its validity is paradoxically recognized. That event thus appears to affirm itself even in its negation. Insofar the assumption finds itself confirmed that evoking that epochal event provides sounding boards, semantic fields, worlds of images and rhetorical figures, thus determining moral judgment in reality and the present. Thus the event, despite any weakening of its impact in memory, still maintains a kind of relative hegemony while providing meaning, linked with epistemic preservation as it were of what is understood emphatically as history. But at what experience and at what historical sounding-board may such a common historical conscious emerge? Is it a result of mere deliberations, of negotiations,

so to say, or an outcome of universally generalized convictions, on human judgment, so to say?

Let's ramble through several spaces of experience related to our core event – WWII in order to evaluate its universality as well as its limits.

At the center of the historical stage of WW II is the German Reich – even though and not only from an East Asian perspective, the temporal beginning of the conflict later denominated as WWII can be seen in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The Asiatic perspective will certainly be taken into account, but for reasons grounded later on the epistemic question, even that perspective will be considered however from a European vantage. And although we do distinguish between a horizontal, a continental axis of the war besides a north-south axis of events and of a colonial nature, the core European memories are thus positioned on the horizontal axis, evoking the continental perspective. Situated at its far Western extremity is the continental power France, in the East Russia, or more precisely, the Soviet Union. Two strands of interpretation extend from cipher enshrined in the denominations Russia and SU. Russia represents the predisposition of geopolitical continuity in the European history of continuous power-struggle. It extends far back into the earlier periods of the 18th and 19th century, evoking the logic of the European balance or its fracture. In turn, the cipher “Soviet Union” represents a unique mode of change for 20th century's history – the introduction of ideologically imbued politics into world affairs. That became significant in the inter-war period, evoking an opposition between the revolutionary Soviet power and the Western powers, a juxtaposition which was transcended for a very short period of time during WWII in order to become forcefully continued during the Cold War. The exceptional short period of the political validity of the Grand Alliance was characterized by the common effort to subjugate Nazi Germany which waged a racial war of annihilation especially in the East. The Western component of continental warfare essentially follows the patterns of a European war for hegemony. The military defeat of France in the early summer of 1940 is significant for this perspective. It evokes the memory of the traditional repetitive German-French strife, calling forth the corresponding interpretations and its associated *lieux de memoire*, especially Sedan in 1870, and of course WW I, symbolized by the *lieu* “Compiègne.” The departure of France from the war, perceived as a perplexing defeat (*étrange défait*, Marc Bloch), permits for a time a temporary shift from the horizontal axis otherwise valid for the continental field of battle, to the vertical axis and herewith the South.

In a striking way, France combines the interlocking of continental *and* colonial axis of events as well as their related memories. This is manifest in a strikingly fractured French history of war in the light of the eventual history of the European theatre and beyond. Just as it ends for France on the continent in 1940, that history of war continues on, against the backdrop of European developments as a whole seemingly paradoxical, with especial verve in the

colonial sphere after 1944, actually not to come to an end until the conclusion of the war in Algeria in 1962. The interlocking of these two differently imbued spaces represent a major challenge to historical memory. It is even amplified by the very experience, that in terms of actual historical events, this dramatic constellation is manifested in the circumstance that persons and personalities who were in the front ranks of resistance against the German occupation, i.e. members of the Résistance, people from the left, immediately after the war and in the attempt to ensure that the colonies remained in French possession, and this by presenting republican and universal arguments for their task, resorted to the use of indiscriminate violence, methods so typical in colonial warfare. The similarity of that violence to the violence suffered by French from German hands by those very resistance fighters became evident. Significant for this constellation of repetitiveness was the use of torture followed by a public discourse about torture in France at different later junctures – simultaneous with its use in the later 1950s in Algeria, but also at temporally shifted intervals in the 1990s and again at the beginning of the new millennium. The intersection of the *système concentrationnaire* and the colonial practice of indiscriminate warfare, experienced possibly by one and the same person and on different side of the threshold might offer a unique perspective for comparison, distinction, understanding and cognition as the proper means for moral and historical judgment.

The integration of the colonial sphere into a universally directed or globalizing history of memory of World War Two is indeed most dramatically manifest in the context of the French experience. Yet the British experience is probably of greater significance in terms of history proper. That is not only because after the defeat of France, Great Britain was compelled to stand alone in waging the battle against Nazi Germany until the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the entry of the United States into the war in December established some relief. England also waged the military conflict in substantial measure from the colonies, and India as a pivot of imperial power was crucial to Britain's war effort. In addition, spatially India constitutes the link between the European/Atlantic and the Asian/Pacific theatres of war. India is central for such a nexus because of its imperial commitments: British policy, due to the very evident overexpansion of its imperial realm in the interwar period and especially in view of the politics of the revisionist powers in Europe in the 1930s, found it obligatory to chose a practicable path between its efforts to preserve the balance of power on the continent and to maintain its empire while using limited means to that end. With the slogan "Empire First," Britain had not only embarked upon a more indulgent policy toward Hitler, but had paved the way later to be able to wage the war against the axis powers in Europe and North Africa from its imperial spaces. India served as the power center both for men and materiel. In addition, China, which had been overpowered and ravaged by Japan, was supported by an American airlift via India – the model for the later

Berlin air-lift of 1948. This is the Asian theatre of war seen through the prism of a European perspective, differing from a view that would approach both theatres on a more equal basis. (A conceptual distinction between the two theatres of the war and privileging the European vantage, suggests itself as based on very genuine historical circumstances: namely the fact that a final bond was avoided in any case until the summer of 1945 due to the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty of 1941. This decision to hold both theatres loosely apart while privileging the European continental perspective in association with its proper colonial *hinterland* is confirmed by the circumstance that the Japanese-Soviet accord was scrapped by Moscow only with the end of the war in continental Europe and in between the two American atomic airdrops on Japan.)

Our intended distinction between two spatially distinctive power fields – European-Asian and Asian-Pacific – is confirmed by a veritable pivotal event in history from the British perspective: Fortress Singapore and especially its surprising fall into enemy hands in February 1942. This British defeat by the Japanese is considered an augur of the nearing end of historical British rule in Asia. And it is not surprising that the following summer, the anti-colonial rebellion of the Indian national movement, with the mobilizing slogan “Quit India” directed at the British, came specifically in the footsteps of this historical defeat. Even from an Asian perspective, this defeat and the Indian contestation that came on its heels in face of a Japanese advance that it facilitated was alarming. However, from a European perspective the developments were rather dramatic. After all, British conduct of the war was being not insignificantly directed from India making extensively advantage of Indian resources in men and material.

The “Indian” moment for a history of WWII especially while focused on the European theatre and its pivotal events entails rather bleak consequences for universalizing the judgmental queries we are interested in. Whatever the ultimate results of such an entanglement of perspectives might be – for an integrated history of WWII, embracing different views in real past time as well for a re-negotiation of memory as a basis for future universal history of the event, the Indian perspective bare many advantages for deepening knowledge and understanding, especially when a continental and a colonial perspective ought to be fused.

The glance from the Indian subcontinent leads further on to the north, following the line of requirement of British warfare as it was implemented.

Our glance falls first on Iran. In 1941 the country was functionally divided between the Soviet Union which controlled the north and Britain in the south. On the whole, this resembles the situation in the country after the British-Russian 1907 accord that put an end to the extended strategic conflict between the two powers, a confrontation dubbed the “Great Game”. The temporary

partition of Iran during WW II was in part due to the pro-German attitude of the then Shah, and also served to improve supply channels of material support for the Soviet Union via the Persian Gulf in the framework of the American “lend lease” program. From the Iranian perspective, this was mere colonial intrusion into the sovereignty of the country; to boot, it was *déjà vu*, a continuation of earlier experiences in confrontation with imperialism. Combining the events of the immediate war years with subsequent postwar events, then from the Iranian vantage, a perspective takes hold in which the essential confrontation in WW II, as inscribed in the continental view, namely the struggle against Nazi Germany, contracts to a very low level in memory. Among those postwar events of Iranian humiliation were the initial refusal by Moscow to vacate the northern part of Iran, which had been accorded to the Soviets only temporarily, and the 1953 coup against the nationalist Mossadegh government, engineered by the US and Great Britain.

Casting glance to the Arab world, then the perspective is even radicalized, or to put it even more pointedly, it decouples almost totally from the continentally calibrated contexts of prevailing Western historical understanding, judgment and of memory. This is generally articulated in a widespread sympathy for Nazi Germany due in part to anti-colonial sentiment and partially to the associated question of Palestine. The first concrete manifestation of this sympathy for Berlin was the anti-British coup of Rashid Ali al-Ghailani in Iraq in the spring of 1941, which was only put down by the disembarkation of British-Indian troops dispatched from the Subcontinent. The situation of the Jews in Mandatory Palestine was especially dramatic: they were protected from suffering a fate similar to the Jews on the European continent only because of the fact that they were part of the British defense-perimeter bolstered to protect its imperial possessions in South Asia and the sea and air routes leading there. Through the distinction between events on the continent and those in the non-European British possessions and territories, especially in the Middle East, a buffer zone in the line of the defense of South Asia, one may see the importance of the spatial perspective and associated perspective of memory as a basis for further knowledge and finally of historical judgment.

However, a closer gaze on continental events might contribute to deconstruct the largely accepted dualistic image of the war into a more complex, fragmented, even kaleidoscopic picture of a multitude of wars of different scope, extend and meaning. The magisterial event emerging in the course of events and being denominated only in 1941/ 42 as the “Second World War” in analogy, perception and interpretation alongside the experienced contours of its alleged predecessor – the Great War, falls apart in various different components, partial war or sub-wars, each with its specific configuration, imbued with various paradoxical moments at the backdrop and in view of the overall war and its dire course. The binary-coded image of the macro-event grows successively blurred.

Take the ambiguous event of the Finnish-Soviet winter war of 1939/40 as a point of departure, a war on its own right, when Finland was supported by the Western powers Britain and France as the pillars of the system of collective security, while the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations. The “war of continuation,” namely Finland’s participation in the Nazi German war against the Soviet Union, in particular the participation of Finnish troops in the siege of Leningrad, opens up a different constellation – the established constellation of WWII. However, for Finnish consciousness it is one war.

Most observers regard the Polish case as the probably most paradox constellation to consider. And that paradox might have considerable consequences for questions of understanding and especially for representation. Thus the common occupation of Poland in September 1939 by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union occurred on the one hand against the backdrop of a course of geopolitical continuities – to become denominated as the “Fourth Partition” of Poland between Germany and Russia. This interpretation makes obviously much sense. However on the other hand and beyond the alleged “eternal” geopolitical considerations the nature of the regimes of both neighbors of Poland cannot be ignored, especially because it acquires major emblematic importance for the future, and especially for the future Cold War. Thus, the Hitler-Stalin Pact which preceded the fourth Polish partition is considered a foundational motif in the theory of totalitarianism to emerge. From a Western-liberal viewpoint, the cooperation of the two dictators is interpreted as an expression of the analogous character of their regimes. The underlying assumption is that democratic polities could not carry out such unforeseen fitful revulsion without inflicting fundamental internal damage on their very legitimacy.

Along with questions of geopolitics and the nature of regime, further particularities in the notorious case of Poland/Russia evoke quite remote elucidations. Against the backdrop of WWII and its dominant constellation the Polish-Russian/Soviet divide calls to mind the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 as an event which is on the one hand widely neglected in its importance, however infected the relations of both for decades. The war of 1920 might be characterized as a veritable war for Polish independence, a constellation to repeat itself through and during the WWII, especially during the iconic event of the Warsaw uprising in August 1944. The uprising did not only follow the patterns of historical memory of the Polish uprisings in the 19th century, but seemed even during the event itself situated beyond the constellation established by the *Grand Alliance* and its strategic considerations. In its basic thrust, this uprising was directed militarily against the German occupiers, however politically against Russia, revoking allegedly “eternal” constellations. The Western allies were neither geopolitically nor logistically in the position to meet Polish expectations. It was simply another war. And while the August uprising took place virtually simultaneous with the advance of the Allied troops in France and the liberation of Paris, it evoked an imaginary political landscape,

meshing with Poland's self-image as belonging rather to western Europe, west of Germany, then to be situated so tragically to its east, evading its fate imbued with repetitiveness.

Repetition or other modes of re-staging of past configurations can also be diagnosed in another sub-region of the European theatre – the Balkans. There, with slight modification, it would appear that the constellation of the Second Balkan War (June 1913) repeats or reproduces itself on into the historical pattern of World War I and II, a kind of palimpsest of memory and comprehension. As Greece and Bulgaria faced one another as adversaries in the early summer of 1913, Greece, though not until much later, entered World War One on the side of the Allies, while Bulgaria was allied with the Central Powers. Meanwhile Serbia, as is well-known, was right from the beginning of course at Russia's side, even the notorious foe of the Central Powers and served in significant measure to spark the Great War. In World War Two, the constellation was not much different. Only Romania shifted sides in the third edition of this disguised Balkan Wars repeat in World War Two, by joining the Axis (together with Bulgaria). In terms of historical events, and especially concerning the peculiar fabrics of memory in action previous configurations would prove to be highly significant in regard to what would become the later core event of WW II-memory – the Holocaust.

On closer scrutiny it appears, that the closer a country was to Nazi Germany, and especially had not been militarily occupied by the Reich, the situation of the Jews became critical only later on, their dramatic deterioration was 'delayed', so to say. That holds true in the Balkans for Bulgaria and for Hungary and Romania, allies of the Reich. These states had certainly instituted their own anti-Jewish policies, but because of their relatively preserved independence their Jewish population was somehow detracted for a time from direct German grasp and thus annihilation. The Jews of Hungary were transported to their mass annihilation only after the country became directly occupied by the Germans in spring 1944. This scenario thickens in regard to those countries directly occupied and thus subjugated by the Germans. That begins with the "Anschluss" of Austria which was met with the zealous readiness of the Austrian population to be 'included' in the German Reich. On the other hand, it was certainly an occupation as well, where, unlike yet in the "Altreich" anti-Jewish measures became possible which would only become a reality in Germany proper with the *Kristallnacht* violence of 9 November 1938. The fact that anti-Jewish policy in Austria was more radical from March 1938 on than in the German Reich proper (the Altreich) the same time up to that juncture was linked with the occupation of the country i.e. the transformation of its rule. By placing themselves above the country's own administration pure Nazi intentions could have been executed directly. A similar state of affairs was observable in the Netherlands. The royal house and government fled 1940 into exile in Great Britain, and the German access to the Jewish population was thus direct.

Almost all the Jews of the Netherlands fall victim to persecution and the deportations to annihilation. The constellation in Belgium differed; the royal house remained in Brussels, and thus – besides the fact that no religious status registration existed – the Belgian authorities played along. In any event, in Belgium a much smaller number of Jews were victimized by the Nazis, compared with the neighboring Netherlands.

Such and similar conditions existed elsewhere, such as Denmark, and on a margin of events and more remote from the constellation on the continent, namely in Spain. Although the Spanish Civil War is regularly regarded as part of the immediate pre-history of WWII, at the same time Spain was a peripheral terrain spatially, and temporally a smaller-scale prelude. This was indeed factually the case to a certain degree when the later Nazi/Soviet conflagration and a right/left divide is considered as a mean of political distinction. As far as WW II is concerned, and especially at the backdrop of its later fully recognized core event, the Holocaust, Spain fully recedes to the European periphery. Franco's Spain in any case sought to remain at a distance from the struggle on the continent. Although the "Blue Division" was dispatched to the Eastern front, Spanish partaking bore all the signs of a non-participatory participation. Only much later did Spain join the community of a shared European memory impregnated by WW II and the Holocaust.

That in turn gives rise to thoughts about the extent to which after the war, or more precisely: after the great watershed turn of 1989/90, the new incipient *European* memory of World War Two increasingly crystallized around the fate of the Jews, despite all the differences in national experience in this regard. There can be no doubt that the Jews and their annihilation became the central icon of remembrance in European memory. As a result of their diasporic patterns of life they were spread across the continent. Insofar did the destruction of European Jewry pursued by the Nazis later on establish a kind of negative tranche in European belonging, reflecting the negative unification of the continent by war and extermination. The annihilation of the Jews in all countries under Nazi control remained in negative retrospect a commonly shared feature in continental memory not only because of a moral obligation, but because its' meaning as an epistemic crisis – a destruction beyond utility and meaning, it establishes a foundational event in modernity's negativity.

But how far does that comprehension reach? Is its epistemic surplus value solely applicable to the realm of Western, European experience and understanding? Are they a direct consequence of the Western history of development, and possibly an expression of secularized Christianity? Is such a comprehension solely the result of the Western tradition of Enlightenment? Is it appropriate and intellectually fair to demand such a comprehension of other cultures, perhaps more powerfully imbued with spiritual content, having experienced the suppression and atrocities of Western colonialism? Especially in face of the growing encounter between Western cultures of Enlightenment

with their distinctive highly anthropocentric view of the world, and cultures with a more theocentrically imbued understanding of world and universe.

Thus, it would seem likely to hypothesize that a consciousness saturated with the sacred would seek to reject the Holocaust as a rupture of civilization, an epistemic crisis in the sense of the refutation of the tradition of Enlightenment against the backdrop of the norms and provisos of Enlightenment. This might be connected with the circumstance that the Enlightenment put itself in God's stead, or more precisely: laid claim to that position which previously had been reserved for God. And when in Western consciousness the Holocaust appears to supplant the Enlightenment, this very negation of the Enlightenment, the Holocaust, situates itself precisely at the singular locus reserved for God, and thus the Absolute. This is equivalent to blasphemy. Such attitudes are not found solely in certain and extreme tendencies of Islam, but may count their exponents within Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Judaism as well.

With such an ambiguous perspective we might close our panoramic inquiry on the meaning, scope and limits of the image of WWII with the Holocaust at its core as a fundamental means for further historical comprehension and moral judgment in a progressively globalizing world.

1492 / 1942 - Paisajes de memoria en la Europa transmoderna

Christiane Stallaert

Resumen

El paisaje de la Europa 'transmoderna' (Rodríguez Magda), que incluye la herencia de la modernidad y la transforma y trasciende, se puede leer como espacio heterotópico de su propio pasado jalonado por dos fechas emblemáticas, 1492 / 1942. Ambos hitos históricos contribuyen a vertebrar la memoria social de la Europa del siglo XXI. A diferencia del concepto de 'memoria colectiva' ('collective memory') que sugiere una interpretación común y valores compartidos, la noción de memoria 'compilada' ('collected memory', James E. Young) reconoce que en una Europa transmoderna la memoria social se construye a partir de una compilación de memorias (nacionales, regionales y locales) y contra-memorias que llenan los 'lugares de memoria' del paisaje europeo de significados heterogéneos, incompatibles y hasta conflictivos. Leer este paisaje supone descifrar, mediante traducciones diacrónicas y sincrónicas, la sintaxis 'radicante' (Bourriaud) por la que transitan las identidades transmodernas.

Introducción

La pregunta planteada en la propuesta del programa de esta tarde concierne la relación entre el presente y el pasado (o la presencia del pasado) en la Europa de hoy. Así formulado, entramos de lleno en el debate sobre la Memoria, que, como la ha definido Pierre Nora se puede definir como el pasado presente ('the present past'), por oposición a la Historia, que se define en este caso como el pasado pasado ('the past past'). Así planteado, Memoria e Historia son, como escribe Reyes Mate en su ensayo *La herencia del olvido*, 'dos miradas distintas dirigidas sobre el pasado al principio: mirada interna, la primera, y mirada externa, la segunda'.¹

Si el Siglo XX ha sido reconocido por prominentes historiadores, sociólogos y antropólogos² como el Siglo del Genocidio, el Siglo XXI parece haber nacido bajo el signo de la Memoria como uno de los temas centrales del debate social y político, una memoria a menudo asociada con las prácticas genocidas del pasado. Fue el filósofo y sociólogo francés Maurice Halbwachs, víctima del nazismo (murió en el campo de Buchenwald en marzo del 1945), quien con su obra *Los cuadros sociales de la memoria* fundó las bases de una nueva

¹ Reyes Mate, *La herencia del olvido*, Madrid 2008:176.

² Véase, entre otros, Leo Kuper, Eric Hobsbawm, Alexander Laban Hinton, Mark Levene, Eric D. Weitz.

disciplina tan floreciente hoy, conocida como los Estudios de la Memoria. A partir de los conceptos e ideas expuestas por Halbwachs se ha ido desarrollando en los últimos años la 'caja de herramientas' necesaria para analizar e interpretar el trabajo de memoria de las sociedades humanas. En la presente ponencia pretendemos reflexionar sobre el diálogo que mantiene la Europa del siglo XXI con su 'pasado presente'. En primer lugar introduciremos algunos conceptos para a continuación ilustrar nuestro análisis con un ejemplo concreto.

La Europa Moderna: el árbol

Uno de los conceptos centrales de los Estudios de la Memoria es el de 'lieux de mémoire' (lugares de memoria), concepto que remite a la obra del mismo nombre del historiador francés Pierre Nora³. Nora concibió su obra en el marco de una identidad nacional - Francia como Estado-Nación – y no incorporó a su lectura las memorias alternativas o contra-memorias (e.o. coloniales) constitutivas del espacio francés. El análisis de Pierre Nora se inserta, pues, en una visión aún 'moderna' de las identidades colectivas, visión emblematizada en nuestro análisis por los dos referentes históricos de 1492 / 1942, que delinean simbólicamente los contornos de la Europa Moderna.

La identidad colectiva en la Europa Moderna se deja representar por un árbol con sus raíces. Las raíces se hunden en la tierra que alimenta el tronco y la copa con su savia. La salud del árbol requiere una constante 'poda' de ramas enfermas o indeseables. 'Blut und Boden' - sangre y suelo- traducen metafóricamente esta concepción 'radical' (cfr. 'raíces') de la identidad nacional y 'extirpar' es la acción clave que garantiza la salud de la nación. Es así como se construyó la nación española a partir de 1492. 'Extirpar y destruir' fue la misión que se propusieron los Reyes Católicos de cara a las minorías etnorreligiosas en suelo peninsular: judíos y 'moros'. Esta misión aparece claramente formulada en los documentos históricos, tales como el epitafio en la tumba de los Reyes en Granada, el Edicto de Expulsión de 1492, o el testamento del Rey don Fernando a su nieto Carlos V. La construcción de la identidad española se caracteriza como un largo proceso de 'amputaciones de miembros infectos' a lo largo de la historia nacional.⁴

En su diccionario etimológico, Corominas relaciona 'extirpar' (del latín *exstirpare*, 'desarraigar', 'arrancar') con el sustantivo 'estirpe', tomado del latín *stirps*, 'base de un árbol', pero también 'raza, familia, estirpe' o linaje.⁵ En la

³ Pierre Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire*, publicado en varios tomos entre 1984-1992.

⁴ Véase Christiane Stallaert, *Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España*. Barcelona: Anthropos / Proyecto A, 1998.

⁵ J. Corominas, *Diccionario crítico de la lengua castellana*. Berna: Francke, 1954, Vol. II, p. 433.

Alemania de 1942, esta acción clave de la construcción nacional moderna se traduce como 'ausrotten', un verbo fundamental en el diccionario de la Lengua del Tercer Reich, como observó agudamente el judío alemán Victor Klemperer⁶. Si insistimos en ilustrar los contornos de la Europa Moderna a través de la relación traslatoria entre 'extirpar' y 'ausrotten', es precisamente porque el modelo identitario de la Europa moderna es un modelo reactivo a la traducción. La traducción significa el diálogo entre culturas - un puente por el que se van trasvasando ideas, tradiciones, memorias, lenguas - y la identidad 'radical' característica de la Europa Moderna privilegia el monólogo consigo mismo, en el intento de mantener (o recuperar) la supuesta pureza nacional, el *Volkkörper* (el cuerpo colectivo) concebido como un cuerpo homogéneo, de células genéticamente idénticas y autorreproductivas. La 'amputación' de miembros indeseados o infectos (como la poda de las ramas podridas del árbol) es la consecuencia más inmediata de este repliegue identitario, de esta hostilidad a los puentes y trasvases culturales, de la incapacidad, en fin, de toda comunicación intercultural o traducción⁷.

La identidad 'moderna', representada metafóricamente por las raíces y el árbol-sangre y suelo-, se deja estudiar muy bien de acuerdo con un modelo epistemológico arbóreo (cfr. el árbol de Porfirio). Es el modelo epistemológico al que remiten las taxonomías antropológicas que clasifican jerárquicamente las diferentes 'razas' o 'castas' de acuerdo con su grado de pureza, partiendo ya sea del ideal cristianoviejero (1492), ya sea del ideal ario (1942). En los famosos cuadros de castas del imperio colonial español o en el organigrama de los presos de los campos de concentración nazi vemos una realidad humana clasificada en casillas cerradas, sin puentes ni trasvases, ordenadas de acuerdo con la lógica 'radical'. Sin embargo, '1942' significará la quiebra de este modelo. La realidad europea post-Holocausto se caracteriza por intensos flujos de personas, de culturas, de información, requiriendo, pues, un nuevo marco interpretativo, una nueva gramática capaz de leer los nuevos paisajes políticos, sociales y culturales que se han ido configurando, y, pues, los nuevos paisajes identitarios y de la memoria.

La Europa 'transmoderna': el rizoma

Varios son los prefijos con los que se ha intentado colmar esta necesidad de renovación conceptual, desde *postmodernidad*, pasando por *surmodernidad* o *altermodernidad*. No satisfecha con ninguna de estas alternativas, se me ocurrió recurrir al prefijo 'trans-' para expresar la relación en que se mantiene la

⁶ Victor Klemperer, *LTI-Apuntes de un filólogo*. Barcelona: Minúscula, 2001, p.256. La traducción de este verbo 'ausrotten' es un elemento crucial en el debate negacionista, cfr. <http://www.holocaust-history.org/himmler-poznan/ausrotten.shtml>.

⁷ Véase Christiane Stallaert, *Ni una gota de sangre impura. La España inquisitorial y la Alemania nazi cara a cara*. Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg/Círculo de Lectores, 2006

Europa de hoy con su propia modernidad. Una búsqueda en internet pronto me recordó que todo ya está pensado en este mundo, todo ya está dicho o escrito, y así descubrí que el término de 'transmodernidad' había sido acuñado en el año de 1989 por la filósofa valenciana Rosa Ma. Rodríguez Magda en su libro *La sonrisa de Saturno. Hacia una teoría transmoderna*. En un libro más reciente, titulado *Transmodernidad* (2004), la autora reconstruye el peculiar proceso poligenético del término ya que de forma independiente de su puesta en circulación en España en 1989 el término surgió en los años 90 igualmente en América Latina (Enrique Dussel), en Bruselas (en un informe de la Célula de Prospectiva de la Comunidad Europea), así como en Nueva York en una exposición internacional de arquitectura.⁸ El caso es interesante porque nos muestra cómo la génesis del término de 'transmodernidad' obedece a los propios mecanismos transmodernos, que se alejan del modo 'radical' (el modelo arbóreo monogenético: las raíces ancladas en un solo lugar preciso, un tronco alrededor del cual se ordenan las ramas jerárquicamente) para adoptar rasgos rizomáticos (Deleuze y Guattari) y multicrónicos: un modelo poligenético, de brotaciones simultáneas horizontales sin centro ni jerarquía. Este es el modelo epistemológico que nos ofrece la clave para leer el paisaje de la memoria de la Europa del siglo XXI.⁹

En términos de identidades colectivas podemos representar el espacio europeo actual como una extensa superficie, compuesta, por una parte, de 'desiertos' - amplias zonas relativamente homogéneas donde predominan las identidades 'radicales', ya sea modernas (nacionales) o premodernas (locales)- y por otra parte, de 'nodos': las grandes urbes con una población móvil y diaspórica donde, del entrecruce de memorias sociales desterritorializadas, se fraguan las nuevas identidades cosmopolitas. Como observan Levy y Sznajder, a diferencia de la memoria nacional, orientada hacia el pasado en su búsqueda de mitos fundacionales, la memoria cosmopolita mira hacia el futuro e implica algún reconocimiento de la historia y las memorias del 'Otro'.¹⁰ A diferencia de la identidad moderna, reacia a la traducción, ésta (la traducción) se ha convertido en el 'modo' (Benjamin)¹¹ característico y constitutivo de la identidad 'transmoderna'.

Si las zonas 'desérticas' del paisaje europeo se siguen aferrando por lo general a una identidad 'radical' -el pueblo idéntico a su propia imagen y semejanza-, los 'nodos' son los laboratorios del mestizaje, de la 'créolisation', en el sentido etimológico de *criollo* (palabra africana importada en América con la esclavitud y que significa 'el que ha nacido fuera del territorio tribal, ancestral), lo que hace

⁸ Véase Rosa Ma. Rodríguez Magda, *Transmodernidad*. Barcelona: Anthropos, 2004.

⁹ Utilizamos el término de 'paisaje' en el sentido dado por Appadurai al sufijo '-scape'.

¹⁰ Daniel Levy & Natan Sznajder, 'Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory', en: *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2002, 5 (1), 87-106.

¹¹ Steven Randall, 'The Translator's Task, Walter Benjamin (Translation)', en: *TTR: Traduction, terminologie, redaction*, vol. 10, n°2, 1997, p.151-165.

del 'criollo' - en traducción actual - el 'alóctono' (el que no es 'autóctono', producto de la tierra), es decir, el inmigrante de las grandes ciudades europeas. Históricamente hablando, la Modernidad europea con su trilogía de imperialismo, colonialismo, totalitarismo (Hannah Arendt) fue un importante catalizador de los procesos de 'creolización' a escala mundial. El proyecto identitario de la Europa Moderna – cuyo inicio hemos fijado simbólicamente en 1492 se centró en la expulsión de judíos y 'moros' y, paradójicamente, ambos 'Otros' son los mayores catalizadores de la renovación de los paradigmas identitarios en la Europa post-1942, que obligan a Europa a repensar su relación con el pasado. Ya en 1908 en su famoso ensayo, Georg Simmel definió al judío europeo como el prototipo del 'extraño' o 'extranjero' 'que viene hoy y se queda mañana', y que 'por naturaleza no es el dueño de la tierra' (entendido también en el sentido amplio de la 'memoria social') ¹². El mismo rasgo lo comparte hoy la población musulmana que llegó a la Europa de la posguerra como 'trabajadores invitados' para quedarse, cambiando radicalmente el paisaje de las urbes europeas. Así, en los 'nodos' creolizados del espacio europeo confluyen hoy las memorias y contra-memorias de Europa, mientras que los desiertos siguen siendo los depositarios de la memoria canónica nacional y local.¹³ Conviene observar no obstante que la población móvil y diaspórica, que define el carácter cosmopolita de las urbes, a pesar de ser una población 'desterritorializada' (y por lo tanto cortada geográficamente de sus raíces identitarias) es igualmente depositaria de una identidad moderna (nacional) o premoderna (étnica /etnorreligiosa) que intenta mantener viva gracias a sus prácticas sociales tradicionales: rituales y fiestas, la lengua como 'lugar de memoria', las creencias religiosas, etc.. El término de 'transmodernidad' nos permite captar esta complejidad, ya que a diferencia de las alternativas como post-, sur- o altermodernidad, lo interesante de la noción de 'transmodernidad' consiste en que no rechaza sino encierra en su seno la herencia de la modernidad, aunque transformándola y trascendiéndola. En este sentido, la realidad transmoderna abraza identidades sociales modernas (nacionales), premodernas (étnicas) y postmodernas (híbridas o mestizas).

De la memoria colectiva a la memoria compilada: el radicante

Ahora bien, ¿qué puede significar, en una configuración social tan compleja como es la Europa de hoy, la tensión entre memoria (el pasado presente) e historia (el pasado pasado)? ¿Cómo definir, estudiar o representar la memoria social de una Europa 'transmoderna', el diálogo de Europa con su pasado? ¿Cabe hablar de una memoria europea 'colectiva'? Para formular una tentativa

¹² Georg Simmel, 'The Stranger', versión electrónica:

<http://orgtheory.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/simmel01.pdf> . Fecha de consulta: 18/08/2010.

¹³ Aleida Assmann define el 'cánon' como 'the actively circulated memory that keeps the past present', por oposición al 'archivo' que es definido como 'the passively stored memory that preserves the past' (Aleida Assmann, 'Canon and Archive', en: Astrid Erll & Ansgar Nünning (eds.), *A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies*. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2010, p. 98.

de respuesta, nos inspiramos en la teoría estética del crítico de arte francés Nicolas Bourriaud, quien introduce un nuevo concepto botánico –al lado del árbol y del rizoma de Deleuze-, a saber el ‘radicante’.¹⁴

Hablando del arte en la era de la globalización, caracterizado por un proceso de ‘créolisation’, Bourriaud disocia el territorio de origen, ancestral, en el que la identidad queda ‘arraigada’ -hundiendo sus raíces- de lo que llama un ‘espacio radicante’, que nace ‘de una diáspora de signos implantados en un suelo circunstancial’.¹⁵ El artista contemporáneo es, para Bourriaud, un ‘semionauta’: ‘el creador de trayectorias en el seno de un paisaje de signos’.¹⁶ Lo que constituye la identidad del sujeto ‘radicante’ no son las raíces en sí sino la *trayectoria*, la puesta en movimiento de las raíces, la organización del éxodo, que deja marcado el territorio de los sucesivos arraigos.¹⁷ Las urbes cosmopolitas constituyen ‘las islas de un archipiélago urbano, que se entrecomunican sin jamás reducirse a un territorio único’.¹⁸

Las ideas de Bourriaud se pueden trasladar fácilmente al campo de los Estudios de la Memoria y de las identidades, invitándonos a repensar ‘los cuadros sociales de la memoria’ de Halbwachs teniendo en cuenta el cambio de una identidad ‘radical’ a una identidad ‘radicante’. Efectivamente, está claro que la nueva realidad social de la Europa del siglo XXI, en cuanto a creación de una memoria colectiva o social, es difícilmente compatible con la noción de ‘lieu de mémoire’ (*lugar* de memoria), que evoca lo estático y arraigado (territorializado). ¿Cómo aplicarle la noción de *lugar* como soporte de la memoria social al ‘alóctono’ - el que se encuentra literalmente ‘out-of-place’ (fuera de lugar). Históricamente, fue la búsqueda de una identidad ‘radical’ (1492/1942) la que forzó al ‘otro’ de la Modernidad europea al éxodo y a la adopción de una identidad ‘radicante’. En los albores del Siglo XXI, el paisaje de la memoria europea se construye a través del reencuentro y diálogo de las memorias sociales europeas con sus distintas ‘contra-memorias’, las memorias heterotópicas, lo que quedó excluido del cánón nacional o local. En la Europa transmoderna, los lugares de memoria se distribuyen de forma rizomática, sin centro ni jerarquía. Leer este paisaje supone dejarse llevar por la sintaxis radicante por la que transitan las memorias sociales y sus respectivas contra-memorias. A diferencia de la noción de ‘memoria colectiva’ (‘collective memory’) que sugiere una interpretación común y valores compartidos o consensuados, el ‘euro-scape’ del siglo XXI se define mejor como un espacio de memorias sociales ‘compiladas’.¹⁹

¹⁴ Nicolas Bourriaud, *Radicant. Pour une esthétique de la globalisation*. Denoël, 2009.

¹⁵ Bourriaud, op.cit. p. 84 y 85.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 118.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 88.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 84.

¹⁹ ‘collected memories’, James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory. Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1993.

El Monumento a las Víctimas del Holocausto (Madrid)

Quisiéramos ilustrar nuestro análisis con un ejemplo concreto, a saber el Monumento a las Víctimas del Holocausto de Madrid. Aunque se trata de un 'lugar de memoria' situado en España es obvio que de acuerdo con la lógica rizomática podríamos iniciar nuestro itinerario en cualquier otro lugar del espacio europeo.

A diferencia de James E. Young²⁰, que se interesa por la 'biografía' de lugares de memoria concretos (es decir, la reconstrucción del debate previo y posterior a la instalación del monumento o memorial y el modo en que interactúa con su entorno), lo que nos interesa es interpretar la sintaxis que conecta este Monumento, 1) con el 'desierto' del entorno (en este caso, la memoria local y nacional) y 2) con otros 'nodos' del paisaje europeo (las urbes donde se fragua la memoria cosmopolita).

El Monumento a las Víctimas del Holocausto, inaugurado en abril de 2007, se ubica en el Jardín de las Tres Culturas del parque Juan Carlos I, un parque creado recientemente en una zona periférica de rehabilitación, en un nudo de autopistas entre la M40 y el aeropuerto de Barajas. Su ubicación le confiere al 'lugar de memoria' que el Memorial pretende ser, todas las características de un 'no-lugar', marcado por la uniformidad, la falta de interacción y ausencia de vínculos sociales con el entorno.²¹ El Monumento es una escultura hecha de traviesas de madera de ferrocarril y contiene una figura de la Estrella de David, el símbolo de la comunidad judía, aunque la placa conmemorativa no sólo menciona la memoria de 'las víctimas judías' sino también 'españolas, gitanas y de otros colectivos, que fueron asesinados en los campos de exterminio'²². La elección del tren como símbolo destaca la marginalidad del Monumento con respecto a la memoria del entorno social. Efectivamente, el tren en representación de la 'ausrottung' de los judíos europeos es ajeno a la historia y a la memoria de España, donde la 'extirpación' de los judíos se hizo con medios inquisitoriales y por mar.

Otro elemento que resalta la falta de vínculo de este Monumento con la memoria social del entorno es su ubicación en el 'Jardín de las Tres Culturas'. El Parque Juan Carlos I con el Jardín de las Tres Culturas fue erigido con motivo de la capitalidad europea de Madrid en el emblemático año de 1992, año conmemorativo de 1492, que paradójicamente marcó el final de las Tres Culturas en España. El Jardín pretende 'revalorizar y recuperar' el espíritu de

²⁰ James E. Young, op. cit.

²¹ Marc Augé, *Non-lieux: introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité*, Paris : Seuil, 1992.

²² Agencia EFE 16/04/2007. Véase:

<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/04/15/madrid/1176634677.html>. Fecha de consulta: 30/08/2010.

las Tres Culturas como 'herencia de España'.²³ Si bien la referencia a las 'Tres Culturas' pertenece a la historia peninsular (el pasado pasado o el 'archivo'), obviamente no forma parte de la memoria social (el pasado presente o el 'cánon'). Como hemos observado anteriormente, el proceso de construcción nacional se caracterizó como una serie de amputaciones – podas- y no como un proceso integrador de minorías y es aquel proceso, el antagonismo identitario con 'moros' y judíos', el que quedó inscrito en la memoria social española.²⁴

Visto desde 'el desierto', el conjunto de Monumento y Jardín se caracteriza como un 'no-lugar' en el paisaje español ya que sus referentes remiten más bien a la contra-memoria que al cánon de la memoria social española. Apela, pues, más bien a una memoria cosmopolita (integradora de las contra-memorias) característica de los 'nodos' del paisaje europeo (las grandes urbes) que a la memoria local o nacional. Para poder entender su significado como 'lugar de memoria' habría que restituirlo, pues, dentro de la red de 'nodos' del paisaje europeo.

Los distintos 'lugares' de la memoria del Holocausto se distribuyen por el espacio europeo de forma rizomática, sin centro ni jerarquía aunque vinculados entre sí por la sintaxis 'radicante'. Observemos, en el mapa de los Memoriales del Holocausto repartidos por el mundo, la situación de España y de Grecia.²⁵ La comparación de ambos países destaca la marginalidad española con respecto al Holocausto y la centralidad de Grecia. La interpretación de ambos mapas supone reconstruir la sintaxis radicante entre ambos lugares, ya que la abundante presencia de Memoriales del Holocausto en Grecia se deriva, precisamente, de su ausencia en España. Las comunidades judías de Grecia víctimas del nazismo, eran mayoritariamente sefardíes, descendientes de los expulsados de España en 1492. El Memorial de Tesalónica, en memoria de los 54.000 judíos de la ciudad que murieron en el Holocausto, representa un árbol, cuya copa simboliza las llamas del fuego. A diferencia del Memorial de Madrid cuyos referentes simbólicos están totalmente desvinculados del contexto social e histórico local, el Memorial de Tesalónica conecta plenamente con la memoria y alude al nuevo arraigo que encontraron en esta ciudad los sefardíes diaspóricos expulsados de la Península Ibérica en 1492.

La memoria de los sefardíes nos lleva a Holanda, país que hizo de la 'tolerancia' su marca identitaria nacional. Al igual que el Imperio Otomano, Holanda fue a partir de 1492 un lugar de refugio para los sefardíes, y en los

²³ Véase: <http://www.parquejuancarlos.net/parquejuancarlosi/jardin.htm>. Fecha de consulta: 30/08/2010.

²⁴ Véase Christiane Stallaert, *Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España*, Barcelona: Anthropos / Proyecto A, 1998.

²⁵ Véase el mapa interactivo de los Memoriales del Holocausto: <http://www.memorial-museums.net/WebObjects/ITF>. Fecha de consulta: 30/08/2010. Aunque los datos del mapa no están totalmente actualizados, las tendencias que pone al descubierto son significativas.

siglos posteriores las provincias holandesas se convirtieron en símbolo europeo de la 'libertad de conciencia' y de la tolerancia religiosa. Los rebeldes flamencos que en 1566 se rebelaron en Amberes contra el dominio español (dando inicio a la Guerra de los Ochenta Años), adoptaron la media luna como símbolo de su lucha por la tolerancia religiosa. El lema 'más vale ser turco que papista' aludía a la tolerancia musulmana del imperio otomano donde el estatuto de dhimmi, según los rebeldes flamencos, era preferible a la hoguera inquisitorial. Durante la segunda Guerra Mundial, un grupo de resistentes holandeses se apropió del nombre histórico de 'geuzen' ('rebeldes' o 'mendigos') en su lucha contra el ocupador nazi. En marzo de 1941, trece 'rebeldes' fueron fusilados por los alemanes junto con los líderes de las huelgas de febrero. La rebelión de los 'geuzen' se convirtió así en símbolo de la resistencia anti-nazi. Desde 1987, el galardón del 'geuzenpenning' se otorga cada año a una persona u organización que se haya destacado en la lucha contra la dictadura, el racismo o la discriminación. Este galardón pretende rememorar los ideales de los rebeldes de 1566, al mismo tiempo que el monumento al 'rebelde' ('geuzenmonument') ubicado en el municipio donde se otorga el galardón, es un homenaje a la resistencia anti-nazi.²⁶ Una vez más, 1492 y 1942 son las dos caras inseparables de una misma moneda. Significativamente, en 1992 (el año en que España conmemoró 1492), el galardón holandés fue otorgado a la Fundación Anne Frank. La casa 'cobija' de la familia Frank cuenta entre los museos del Holocausto más visitados y ocupa un lugar importante en la memoria social holandesa. La proverbial tolerancia holandesa no solamente había abierto las puertas a los judíos sefardíes en el siglo XVI, sino que también durante la época nazi Holanda se convirtió en tierra de refugio de numerosos judíos europeos. El arraigo de los sefardíes en Salónica representada por el árbol en el monumento del Holocausto, tiene su eco en la reciente conmoción en Holanda en torno al árbol del patio de la casa de Anne Frank. Después de una larga polémica sobre la necesidad de arrancar el castaño enfermo citado por Anne Frank en sus diarios, el árbol finalmente 'murió' de muerte natural en agosto de 2010, y sus restos serán vendidos en trozos como monumentos del Holocausto.²⁷ La caída del árbol puede ser leída metafóricamente como el desarraigo que después del '1942' sufrió la comunidad judía de Amsterdam, una ciudad que había sido durante siglos un importante centro de la vida judía en Europa y donde apenas queda visible la presencia de esta comunidad.

La trayectoria radicante conduce igualmente a Amberes, ciudad que vivió su Siglo de Oro siendo refugio de judíos sefardíes y 'marranos' hasta que la derrota sufrida por los rebeldes flamencos (fue en esta ciudad donde se creó la rebelión de los 'mendigos') contra el imperio español en 1585 provocara el

²⁶ Véase Stichting Geuzenverzet, <http://www.geuzenverzet.nl/>.

²⁷ El árbol de Anne Frank tiene su propia página en wikipedia: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anne_Frankboom

éxodo de la población judía hacia las provincias del norte (principalmente Amsterdam y Hamburgo). A diferencia de Amsterdam, en Amberes la presencia judía se recuperó después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial como parte integral del paisaje urbano. Amberes es hoy en día la única ciudad europea donde se mantiene viva el yiddish y que cuenta con un 'eruv', dos importantísimos marcadores de la memoria social judía. La presencia significativa de los 'hasidim' (judíos ortodoxos), concentrados en el barrio diamantero de la ciudad, le ha valido a Amberes el sobrenombre de 'Jerusalén de Occidente'.

En las últimas décadas, en Amberes como en otras grandes ciudades de Europa, la población musulmana de origen inmigrante marroquí ha crecido de forma espectacular y la convivencia con la población judía se ha ido tensando. Tanto en Bélgica como en otros países europeos, la exitosa integración de la población musulmana exige el respeto de esta minoría por la memoria local o nacional del holocausto (en muchos casos, esta memoria del holocausto es ajena o incluso conflictiva con la memoria de origen de estos colectivos). Cuando en febrero de 2004, la comunidad marroquí de Bélgica conmemoró sus 40 años de 'arraigo' en el país, lo hizo recordando el papel de sus 'ancestros' en la lucha anti-nazi sacando del 'archivo' de la historia a los más de 2000 soldados marroquíes del ejército colonial francés que murieron en suelo belga, en la batalla de Gembloux, la única efímera victoria aliada sobre la Alemania nazi en 1940. Esta actitud contrasta con las reivindicaciones del grupo islamista 'radicado' en Amberes, Sharia4Belgium, cuya voz se hizo pública por primera vez en abril de 2010. Esta organización difunde en internet mensajes antisemitas ensalzando a Hitler. Este tipo de mensajes antisemitas y negacionistas suelen ser invocados como argumento de fondo por los opositores del islam en Europa (véase el discurso islamófobo de Geert Wilders) y como prueba de que la tolerancia pre-1492 que proponen los musulmanes no sirve para una Europa post-1942.

A pesar del progresivo deterioro de la convivencia, el Ayuntamiento de Amberes intenta mostrar la cara positiva de la realidad multicultural y proyecta la ciudad como la 'Córdoba del Escalda', inspirándose en el modelo medieval de las Tres Culturas en la historia peninsular.²⁸ Está claro que se trata de crear una memoria cosmopolita orientada hacia el futuro, sin conexión con la memoria social local o nacional. La referencia a Córdoba, si es un símbolo vacío para la población autóctona, no lo es para la población inmigrante musulmana. El grupo de Sharia4Belgium (y también otras agrupaciones más moderadas) consideran el histórico modelo de Córdoba, basado en 'leyes'

28 La revista británica *Time* dedicó en 2005 un dossier temático a la 'crisis de la identidad europea', centrado en el multiculturalismo y la convivencia con el Islam con un reportaje sobre Amberes, donde el ambiente se ha ido tensando en las últimas décadas. Uno de los síntomas de la quiebra de la 'convivencia' es el creciente antisemitismo por parte de ciertos sectores de la población musulmana y el paulatino éxodo de los judíos. *Time*, 28/02/2005.

diferenciadas, de acuerdo con las identidades religiosas judía, musulmana y cristiana, como un modelo para la futura Europa multicultural.

Y así la referencia a la Córdoba de las Tres Culturas nos lleva de regreso a España y el monumento de Madrid donde iniciamos nuestro recorrido. En los últimos años, Córdoba como símbolo de la Europa pre-1492 ha venido a ocupar un lugar destacado en el debate político sobre la convivencia entre culturas en la Europa post-1942. En 2004, el presidente de gobierno español José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero lanzó el proyecto de la Alianza de Civilizaciones conjuntamente con el presidente de Turquía Erdogan. En 2007, Naciones Unidas adoptó el programa, fijando la sede de la organización del mismo nombre en Nueva York. Actualmente, más de un centenar de Estados y organizaciones internacionales son miembros del Grupo Amigos de la Alianza. Estados Unidos se incorporó al mismo en mayo de 2010 bajo la presidencia de Barack Obama, quien en su famoso discurso del Cairo de junio de 2009, elogió a Córdoba como símbolo de la tolerancia islámica en un entorno cristiano 'inquisitorial'.²⁹ Es significativa, para nuestro análisis, la reciente polémica en Nueva York – la Nueva Amsterdam fundada en el siglo XVII que ensalza la tolerancia y la libertad de religión como valores esenciales de su identidad- en torno al proyecto de construcción de un centro cultural y religioso musulmán en Zona Cero (Ground Zero). Los promotores del proyecto se apropiaron del nombre de Córdoba como símbolo de la histórica convivencia entre cristianos, judíos y musulmanes, y esperan con el proyecto contribuir a reparar 'la tolerancia, el respeto y la prosperidad' que reinaba hace 800 años en la ciudad medieval española.³⁰ El proyecto suscitó fuertes protestas, que culminaron en la última conmemoración del 11/9 con la amenaza de la quema de coranes y la provocadora presencia del político holandés abiertamente islamófobo Geert Wilders. Córdoba y Auschwitz son los dos lugares de referencia en la polémica que divide a los americanos. Para los detractores del proyecto la construcción de una mezquita en la proximidad de Zona Cero significa la profanación del lugar de memoria más sagrado de la historia reciente de EE.UU y sería como construir un monumento a Hitler en el mismo Auschwitz. Para los promotores se trata de restaurar el espíritu de Córdoba, símbolo de la convivencia o coexistencia de culturas y religiones. En el fondo de la cuestión late la polémica en torno a la apropiación histórica de la 'tolerancia' como elemento de la

²⁹ Actualmente, más de un centenar de Estados y organizaciones internacionales son miembros del Grupo Amigos de la Alianza. Estados Unidos se incorporó al mismo en mayo de 2010 bajo la presidencia de Barack Obama, quien en su famoso discurso del Cairo de junio de 2009, elogió a Córdoba como símbolo de la tolerancia islámica en un entorno cristiano 'inquisitorial'. Véase: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/04/barack-obama-keynote-speech-egypt>. Fecha de consulta: 23/8/2010.

³⁰ 'Ze spuwen ons in het gezicht', *De Standaard* 7/6/2010. Fuente: <http://www.standaard.be/artikel/detail.aspx?artikelid=542R5IFS>. Fecha de consulta: 23/8/2010. Los promotores de la mezquita comprendieron que el nombre de Córdoba era un referente histórico posible catalizador de memorias conflictivas y rebautizaron el proyecto con el nombre aséptico de 'Park 51' (que también ofrecía la ventaja de conectar más con el entorno).

memoria social de Occidente: ¿se perdió la tolerancia en Europa en 1492? Y pues, para recuperarla conviene restaurar el vínculo con la Europa pre-1492, es decir, con el patrimonio musulmán cuyo símbolo es Córdoba. ¿O es la tolerancia europea hija de la Ilustración, iniciada con la lucha de los ‘rebeldes flamencos’ contra la intolerancia, y el posterior triunfo contra el fascismo y el racismo? Es decir, la tolerancia como esencia de la Europa que renace de sus cenizas después de 1942?

A modo de conclusión

En la era de la Globalización, la historia sigue siendo – tal y como dijo Gramsci – ‘contemporánea’, es decir, ‘política’.³¹ El gran desafío para la Europa del siglo XXI en relación con su pasado consiste en la armoniosa sincronización de las memorias y contra-memorias que componen la textura *compilada* de su paisaje de memoria, un mosaico de memorias brotadas de referentes históricos comunes pero diferentemente recordados. Está claro que en los albores del siglo XXI, 1492 / 1942 se presentan como los referentes de la historia y memoria europea con mayor apelo universal y como dos poderosos ejes vertebradores de una potencial memoria cosmopolita, surgida de la confluencia y del entrecruce de las memorias de Occidente con sus contramemorias.

Mientras que la memoria de la Europa Moderna continúa siendo el cánón en los ‘desiertos’, los ‘nodos’ funcionan como amortiguadores y reguladores de los flujos de las memorias modernas. Es en los nodos donde impera el ‘modo’ de la traducción que ayuda a refractar las memorias modernas transformando el paisaje europeo en un espacio transmoderno. En este complejo paisaje, una exitosa integración supone para cada colectivo saber enlazar empáticamente, cada uno desde su propia historia y memoria social, ‘1492’ con ‘1942’.

La construcción de una memoria cosmopolita europea pasará por un reajuste entre recuerdo y olvido, entre cánón y archivo. Las políticas de la memoria de la nueva Europa obligan a entablar un nuevo diálogo con su pasado, con la historia. Un elemento crucial en este debate constituye la traducción de los referentes 1492 / 1942 desde posiciones discursivas muy distintas de acuerdo con la memoria social de los diferentes actores. La batalla por la prerrogativa de la tolerancia (¿esencia de la Europa post-1942 o memoria de Al-Andalus en una Europa pre-1492?) se ha convertido en un ingrediente fijo del debate público sobre la sociedad ‘multicultural’ en nuestro mundo globalizado. En este debate, la memoria de Europa ha dejado de ser patrimonio exclusivo de los ‘autóctonos’ (los nacidos en la tierra herederos de la memoria europea) sino que ha pasado a pertenecer también a sus múltiples ‘Otros’, cuya memoria social se construyó sobre la contra-memoria de Europa.

³¹ Antonio Gramsci, citado en Reyes Mate, *La herencia del olvido*, 2008, p.176.

Europa(s)

Mesa Redonda

Intervención J.E. Ruiz-Domènec

Europa necesita comprender su pasado; por eso reclama la historia como una herramienta fundamental en la educación ciudadana. Abusamos de la historia de Europa cuando creamos mentiras sobre el pasado, nos dejamos llevar por la invención de algo que nos hubiera gustado que ocurriese, pero que no ocurrió, o, simplemente escribimos historias que muestra una sola perspectiva. El reto es cambiar este orden del saber. La historia mal contada sólo explica una parte de los asuntos más complejos, que son sin embargo los más abundantes en el pasado. Por eso necesitamos aprender a evaluar adecuadamente la historia de Europa, y a tomarnos con mucho escepticismo las cosas que se aseguran en su nombre procedente de aficionados o comentaristas sin formación, que hay muchos.

Existe un núcleo obstinado en la historia de Europa: qué ocurrió, y en qué orden. La causalidad y la secuencia son cruciales para comprender el devenir de Europa en los últimos dos mil años. Debemos saber por qué los soldados franceses en Marengo no podían ir vestidos de blanco, como lo habían hecho en las largas jornadas que acompañaron en 1776 a Georges Washington en su lucha contra los casacas rojas ingleses. Los historiadores saben de la importancia de ese principio de distinción, del que sin embargo, lamentablemente, no participa gran parte de los ciudadanos europeos, ajenos al sentido y la sensibilidad, para decirlo con Jane Austen, que acompañan los actos humanos en cualquier momento histórico.

Además de eso el papel de los historiadores ante la Europa del siglo XXI es cuestionar e incluso desmontar los mitos nacionales. La desilusión es necesaria si queremos alcanzar el grado de una sociedad adulta, y evitar el síndrome social de Peter Pan de convertir las razones

del pasado en la escenografía de un juego sobre un mundo que nos resulta extraño, incluso enigmático. No importa que en este proceso queden aislados unos textos históricos plagados de errores intencionados. Como diría Tony Judt, ese gran europeo al que añoramos, el olvido es una perversión del saber de peligrosas consecuencias.

Una historia de Europa, como la que acabo de proponer en mi libro “Europa, las claves de su historia” puede ayudarnos a desentrañar un mundo complicado, pero también nos puede advertir del peligro que representa asumir que sólo hay una forma posible de mirar las cosas, o un curso de acción determinado. Por eso debemos compaginar el conocimiento de la larga duración con el de los detalles concretos que, al cabo, son la sal de la historia.

Saber que hubo tres momentos claves en la construcción europea,

1. El siglo XI, con la definición de las fronteras y el marco cultural alejado del legado greco-latino. Creación de un sistema de valores que organiza la sociedad: el amor como *cuerda* de la sociedad, la novela “europea” como mecanismo de expresión de un pensamiento en imágenes narradas, etc.
2. El tránsito del siglo XV al XVI donde el humanismo deviene Renacimiento y éste articula una reforma que a la postre ofrece una alternativa de renovación malograda en una terrible Guerra de los Treinta Años, la herida espiritual de Europa que dijo el poeta Schiller;
3. El último tercio del siglo XVIII, la época de Mozart, donde se jugó el principio de la sensibilidad y de razón para dar entrada al del sentimiento y la mirada interior: años de conflictos de ideas, pero también de un severo reajuste de los valores territoriales y nacionales debido a las guerras promovidas por Napoleón. Al cabo, todo se explica por el hecho de que la Gran Partita de Mozart transita hasta el Concierto para piano y orquesta numero 4 de Beethoven. Allí se juega todo el sentido, el mismo que ahora queremos darle a un mundo evanescente que sin

embargo conoce bien el significado de los grandes cambios de la historia.

Aprender de la historia de Europa es una necesidad imperiosa, pero como con todas las urgencias hay que tener cierto cuidado; Clio es una musa frágil y huidiza. No gusta de los dogmáticos, ni de los arrogantes burócratas que han decidido indicarnos el camino a seguir. Por suerte aún esta viva en el ánimo (o el alma, sin prefieren) de muchos de sus fieles de amor, los historiadores, entre los que me encuentro. Les invito a entrar en este mundo; verán las cosas de Europa y sobre Europa de un modo más ponderado, preciso y probablemente más tolerante.

The European North-South as a Factor in the Emergence and Decline of Modern Legitimation

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Perhaps the essence of Europe lies in this aporia: that the smallest of continents contains the largest distances. I mean “distance,” as I think the organizers of this conference do, rather figuratively, not in the sense of far-off places but of intervals and disconnections. Separation within proximity, differentiation in similarity, this has been the secret of Europe’s vitality, the source of tensions and conflicts at the origin of its variegated solutions to common impulses. This is to say that strife and competition, as well as emulation and imitation, must be looked upon as an impulse to rationalization in the continent’s political and cultural life. One of Europe’s defining characteristics may well be its kaleidoscopic resolution of a relatively similar social life into a multiplicity of states. But this model, based on the multiplication of political entities, has competed all along with another model based on the accumulation of power in political bodies with a vocation to universal dominance, the imperial model.

If the state is, in its classic definition, a community that has (and exercises) jurisdictional monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, then the empire is a community that claims an expanding monopoly on that legitimacy by enlarging the scope of its violence. Whether one has in mind the Greek city states, competing among themselves but forming a cultural totality; Rome’s sprawling provinces administratively unified by the metropolis; the repeated breakdown of the Holy German empire; or the splintering of Western Christianity into the shards of reformed churches and sects, Europe seems to be permanently caught in a see-saw movement between political homogenization and differentiation, between approximation and distancing. Even now, the so-called process of European integration is slowed by resistance, sometimes at the political level (among euro-skeptics), at other times among disgruntled populations, as for example with the Dutch and French rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in May 2005, or by resentment arising from the tensions introduced in various national economies by the strictures of membership in the euro.

It is possible, though by no means certain, that oscillation between the two principles of state formation (homogenization under a central authority, on the one hand, and so-called balkanization, on the other) reflects conflicting

legitimation models. Max Weber famously described three forms of legitimation. The first is “the authority of the eternal yesterday.” In this case, domination is based on tradition exercised by patriarchal communities and patrimonial states. Among the European states today, only monarchies retain traits derived from this ancient form of legitimation. Their legality is grounded on the historical transmission of a patrimonial right to dominate. Thus, royal dynasties and their pendants, the aristocracies, base their claim to social power on a pre-modern survival, deriving their prestige from an ancient habit of recognition perpetuated in the present out of superstitious enslavement to the past.

The second Weberian form of legitimation is *charisma*, the confidence that awakes the perception of personal qualities, whether in a military chief, a demagogue, or a political leader. The potential for the emergence of dictatorial figures out of charismatic personalities is amply documented in European history. But charisma is also present in the great reformers and founders of movements who achieved their goals by deploying great power of persuasion.

It is the third form, domination secured by means of “legality” that interests us as the paradigmatic form of *modern* legitimation. This is domination based on the belief in the rationality of the legal statute. In this case authority is exercised through abstract rules and managed by the bureaucracy, an impersonal body constituting the state’s scaffolding. Needless to say, this typological analysis does not yield empirically observable species of power that can be assigned to entirely different genres. Traditional legitimation and the concentration of power in one person merge with the separation of law from executive power in the monarchy of Louis XIV, which Jacob Burckhardt considered the first perfected occurrence of the modern state on account of its ability to exercise supreme coercive power on nearly all aspects of life (134). Spain, which also attempted to concentrate all power in the figure of the Emperor and to rule all life through extreme forms of coercion, yielded “a purely consuming and destructive power, or one in any case in which spiritual and temporal were differently blended” (Burckhardt 134). Modernity, then, comes into being at the point where state power becomes both total and secular, and this means that the state replaces the Church as the source of legitimation, converting religion into a merely private affair. The state, in other words, expropriated religion’s authority and therewith its faculty of shaping the public sphere. And with religion’s confinement to the private conscience came the disempowerment of the aristocracy and its eventual replacement by the bourgeoisie.

Weber pointed out the parallelism between capitalism’s advance through expropriation of the independent producers and the state’s development through expropriation of the nobility, the private bearers of territorial power and hitherto the owners of administrative, military, and financial instruments apt to be put to political uses. Expropriation by the state proceeds until all the means of political organization are gathered under one single head, namely the absolute monarch. At this point, says Weber, “the most modern development

begins, and we see with our own eyes the attempt to inaugurate the expropriation of this expropriator of the political means, and therewith of political power” (82). Through revolution or peaceful process, self-made leaders replaced the statutory authorities, gaining control of the apparatus of the state and appealing for their legitimacy to the will of the citizen—or, if this were lacking, deriving it from the alleged incorporation of the essence of the *demos* by the head of state. Weber relates this process of expropriation to the appearance of the professional politician, a figure that enters the service of the prince as manager of political power. In the West, professional politicians soon placed themselves at the service of impersonal powers, the political parties and the organization of abstract domination through the modern state. In turn, the emergence of politics as a distinct social activity gave rise to two attitudes vis-à-vis the new phenomenon. In Weber’s words, “either one lives ‘for’ politics or one lives ‘off’ politics” (84). The terms of this contrast are not mutually exclusive, but represent the conceptual distinction between a life lived in relation to politics in a subjective sense, and an existence that draws its livelihood from politics in an occupational sense, that is, as a permanent source of income.

Modern states—particularly in their classic embodiment, the democratic state—are often said to consist of three branches of government. To each of these branches regulatory functions are assigned, some of which—the police, for instance—serve more than one branch of government. When it comes to the military, however, things are not so clear. In the pre-modern state, armies were at the service of the prince. Due to the force of this tradition, when a national army emerged from the French convention, it immediately reverted to charismatic legitimation, elevating one of its generals, Napoleon, to the status of emperor and recreating the personal ties between soldier and prince. By and by, however, modern armies became bureaucratic organizations staffed by functionaries who, like other officials, cultivate a tight corporate culture and enjoy certain privileges such as a particular juridical system based on special law.

The ambiguity of the military’s precise location within the modern state stems from its organizational structure. On the one hand an army is based on a rigid set of rules and operates like a bureaucracy; on the other hand it is inherently dependent on charismatic leadership. In addition, the verticality of command places the armed forces under the authority of the head of state, who in times of national emergency acts as supreme military commander, assuming extraordinary powers for which statutory legitimation may be insufficient or inadequate in practice. But even then, modern legitimation of authority requires that war be engaged in by appealing to the popular will. This convention stems from the secularization of international law, a process whose intellectual origins Dan Diner traces to Francisco de Vitoria’s unfolding of the Christian doctrine of *bellum iustum* into the notion of war justified by both sides. Vitoria, in other words, formulated the transition from an absolute justification of war to the

modern idea of a right to war, an *ius ad bellum*, as the basis of the people's sovereignty (*Weltordnungen* 63).

It is from this sovereign *ius ad bellum*, which the expropriator of the expropriators nominally restores to society, that the *ius in bello*, the international war conventions, arises. In Diner's sleek formulation, "the acceptance of the state as the single legitimate source of violence application goes together with an internationalization of the authority of the state" (Steht 61). As the religious legitimation of war through just cause evolved into war as consequence of state decisionism, violence was secularized and rationalized. War became an extension of the state, subject to regulations intended to limit its deployment on the battlefield, or more abstractly on the limited area known as theater of war.ⁱ In the 18th century, Frederick the Great said that his dearest wish was to fight his wars without the burgher in town or the peasant in the field being aware of it (Paret 63). The theater of war was meant to be as isolated and exclusive a place as the theater in the court.

Sanctioned by the European interstate order, the bureaucratization of war was responsible for the, in theory, sharp differentiation between combatants and civilians, and for the intensive professionalization of the officers into a body of experts that began to replace what had been until then a hereditary class of warriors. The transformation was enormous in scope and in its consequences. Between ancient and medieval armies differences were smaller than between the armies of the early modern age and those of full-fledged modernity. The Bronze Age coalition of petty Greek kings depicted in the *Iliad* was poles apart from the modern armies specialized in the handling and deployment of men and materiel. For the Greeks described by Homer, weapons were personal property and men's loyalty hinged on attachment to the strong man or petty king of a circumscribed territory. Consider Achilles's withdrawal from the war with his entire following, the fearsome Myrmidons, in the wake of a dispute with Agamemnon, commander-in-chief of the Greek forces. The cause of the fateful clash between "the best of the Greeks" and royal authority was the latter's reduction of the aim of the war to personal ambition. Agamemnon, forced to release Chryseis, his newly acquired bed slave, claims Briseis, Achilles's own prize of war, as replacement, and the great hero, flying into a temper, vows to no longer fight on the side of the Greeks. In a modern war Achilles would have been court-martialed or executed on the spot, but for Bronze Age warriors, as for medieval knights, loyalty was a personal affair subject to the fulfillment of bilateral obligations. The Cid, mishandled by King Alfonso, who breaks faith with his vassal, thereby becomes free to offer his services to the Castilian King's rival, the Count of Barcelona, revealing how close feudal rendering of military services was to mercenary warmongering. The Cid's itinerant militia, roaming Muslim territory in search of *parias* (levies), is closer to Homer's denomination of the Greek force as a "warrior band" than to a *stratos*, the Greek word for army (Strauss 36).

A modern army came into existence when the state became the bearer of the *ius ad bellum*, that is, the agent of actual or potential aggression through a foreign policy no longer founded on a *bellum iustum* or war for a superior cause, but on the permanent possibility of war for the sake of the state. It was at this point that the state acquired standing armies and ever-costlier instruments, while the combined apparatus of force began to develop autotelically in pursuit of its own aims and specialized culture. War became, along with diplomacy—its milder civil face—, a predictable form of competition between sovereignties. In this scenario Carl von Clausewitz could define war as an act of force without intrinsic limits to its application (Ch. 1, § 3, 77), at the same time recognizing that of the two motives that lead men to war, instinctive hostility and hostile intention, the latter predominated in the European wars that offered the empirical basis for his theory. “Hostile intention” refers not to instinctive aggression but to a calculation based on the equation between interests and means. It refers, that is, to war as an activity pursuant to politics. Even so, Clausewitz is aware that the instincts always play a role, for otherwise a thoroughly rationalized confrontation among civilized nations could dispense with the physical masses of combatants and reduce war to an act of intelligence, whereby the relative force of the contenders would be calculated in advance and the result settled in “a kind of war by algebra” (Clausewitz Ch. 1, § 3, 76). In contemporary terms, wars could be fought by computers and resolved by the processing of data entered by militarized programmers. Clausewitz’s proviso notwithstanding, his accent on hostile intention and on intelligence led him to posit a political object as the origin of war and it is, he says, this political object that will determine both the aim of the effort and its intensity (Ch. 1, § 11, 81). With his intellectual “option” in favor of a politically motivated war increasingly governed by reason, Clausewitz reached his famous pronouncement that war is the continuation of policy by other means (Ch. 1, § 24, 87).

Clausewitz wrote his masterwork, *Vom Kriege*, between 1818 and 1830, the years he directed the Military Academy at Berlin. He wrote against the background of the Napoleonic wars, which were naturally his primary source of observations. Previously, he had served with the Russian army in the Moscow campaigns of 1812 and 1813, a decision elicited by his refusal to serve under the invaders of Prussia, but also owing something to the reaction of the Prussian military elite (to which he belonged) to the Spanish uprising against the French occupation in 1808. As Carl Schmitt explains in a review, Clausewitz, in a declaration (*Bekennnisdenkschrift*) written in February 1812 attempted to turn Friedrich Wilhelm III against Napoleon, with whom the Prussian king had just signed an alliance, by reasoning that the Emperor was Prussia’s irreconcilable enemy. Such clarity of political definition was of decisive importance for Schmitt, who observes: “At the heart of this memorandum stands the clear answer to a clear question: who is the true enemy of Prussia?” (“Clausewitz als politischer Denker” 483). Bound up with this question is, for

Schmitt, the issue of legitimacy. And so, he interprets Clausewitz's impolitic declaration as evidence of a historical confusion of legitimations, by which Schmitt understands the principles of justification defining the *ius ad bellum* and guaranteeing the good conscience of the combatants ("Clausewitz" 483).

The principles of legitimation that came into conflict in 1812 were on the one hand the dynastic, allied at this time with the imperial aggressor and his conquering army, and on the other hand the national, for which the Spanish people in arms, locally organized in autonomous guerrilla units, were the world-historical prototype. Schmitt shrewdly isolates a marginal notation in the manuscript, allegedly by Hermann von Boyen, in angry response to the then common phrase "Germans are not Spaniards!" As Schmitt explains: "A spark sprung from Spain had reached the North. There it became a true political myth and helped the German resistance against Napoleon. Pessimists, defeatists and Napoleon's friends reacted with the phrase: Germans are not Spaniards" ("Clausewitz" 485). Defenders of the status quo often reject comparison with tempting successful models. Frederick Wilhelm sensed that his dynastic legitimacy might be questioned if Prussian army reformers like von Boyen or Gneisenau succeeded in arming the people against Napoleon, a situation that could lead to the installation of a competing national legitimacy.

The significance of the Spanish rekindling of the war after the defeat of its regular armies does not lie, for Schmitt, in the efficient cause of Spaniards' bellicosity (whether it be their religious fanaticism, as Napoleon complained, or their lack of culture, or their loyalty to the Bourbons) but in the fact that the failure of central authority and the consequent lack of overall coordination allowed the spontaneity to erupt that is crucial for the conduct of a popular war. The novelty in Spain was the success of the fragmentation of action that the Prussian resistance-conspirators tried to avoid in their planning (Schmitt, "Clausewitz" 487). In the newly founded War College, Clausewitz lectured on guerrilla warfare. He and the followers of Gerhard Scharnhorst, head of the Military Reorganization Commission to which Clausewitz was also appointed, correlated patriotism with the figure of the partisan and worked to introduce his qualities of initiative and self-reliance into the regular army. But they did not expect that insurrections on a national scale could happen in Northern Europe (Paret 97). In this sense Germans were indeed not Spaniards.

And vice versa, the Germans were not in the hands of fanatic clericalism, although patriotic enthusiasm could on occasion use the language of religion, as in Theodor Körner's poem "Aufruf" (Summons): "It is not a war that crowns know of; it is a crusade, a holy war" (Clark 552). Nor were Germans an indolent people, but a diligent, reasonable people. Whence—asked Napoleon—their hostility? Focusing on Clausewitz's memorandum Schmitt detects, in the midst of military calculations, a philosophical component that comes from German idealism as Fichte had molded it in response to the aspiration to national-revolutionary legitimacy. Such philosophical enmity, remarks Schmitt, would not have confronted Napoleon in contemporary Spain ("Clausewitz" 492). After

1807 Fichte's principle of the self's radical freedom found its concrete negation in the person of the emperor. And thus Napoleonic imperialism met with a reply that, says Schmitt, Napoleon's consciousness did not register but which adumbrated nonetheless a new political constellation. Napoleon believed he had completed the French revolution, while in fact the revolutionary legitimacy had been absorbed by the national, and as national legitimacy it could no longer legitimize French imperialism ("Clausewitz" 496). On the contrary, the strong French nationalism pushed the neighboring peoples to seek their own national legitimation and to recast themselves as nations.

Fichte's *Discourses to the German Nation*, presented to very small audiences in French-occupied Berlin, constitute a fundamental document and primary philosophical basis for the emergence of the cultural legitimation of modern nation states. By predicating resistance on the absoluteness of the "I", Fichte lifted all philosophical limits on the idea of freedom: "He who sets no limit whatever for himself, but on the contrary stakes everything he has, including the most precious possession granted to dwellers here below, namely, life itself, never ceases to resist, and will undoubtedly win the victory over an opponent whose goal is limited" (124). Surely, nothing similar is to be found in Spain, where cultural elites were made up of French sympathizers, and where the national insurgency against the invader was fueled not by a philosophy of radical freedom but by the prejudice of dogmatic minds (with the cry "long live the chains!" the populace hailed the absolutist restoration). It was in Berlin too that Fichte's philosophical enmity to Napoleon met its opposite in Hegel's admiration. This philosophical tension, which recaptures the legitimation dilemma identified at the beginning as constitutive of European politics, was according to Schmitt a formative element in the German landscape of the years 1807-1812 (493).

In Berlin as elsewhere, says Schmitt, traditional royalism was at first not shaken by the news from Spain. "After the wars of independence, Hegel's philosophy was dominant in Prussia. It sought a systematic mediation of revolution and tradition. It could be considered to be conservative philosophy, and it was. But it also conserved the revolutionary sparks, and through its philosophy of history of the ongoing revolution it provided the Jacobins with a dangerous ideological weapon, even more dangerous than Rousseau's philosophy" (*Theory of the Partisan* 48). For Schmitt, the line that goes from Hegel to Lenin over Marx, that is, from the theory to the practice of revolution was also the channel of transmission for a fundamental insight formulated by Clausewitz. Schmitt does not have in mind Clausewitz's famous statement about war being an extension of policy but rather the Schmittian notion that, in the era of revolution, the essential distinction is that between friend and foe. The radicalism of this dichotomy is what makes revolutionary war the expression of absolute hostility.

The absolute enmity that Napoleon encountered in the Spanish guerrilla, a violence roused by the instinctive hostility that arises from a *bellum iustum*,

was reformulated by Clausewitz into a *ius ad bellum* powered by hostile intention before evolving into a new dispensation of violence in the total wars of the 20th century. In the new species of warfare, violence, while remaining within the standpoint of the *ius ad bellum*, drew again from a sort of metaphysical justification originating in irreducible enmity. Justification of war through absolute hostility removed the limits set by the international law created by European states in the 18th century; it finally eradicated the very principle of *ius ad bellum*, or more precisely, absorbed it into the revolution (and its upshot, the totalitarian state) turning it into the supreme arbiter and justification of total war. "The alliance of philosophy with the partisan, concluded by Lenin, liberated new and unexpected explosive forces. It provoked nothing less than the shattering of the whole historical Eurocentric world that Napoleon had expected to save, and which the Congress of Vienna had attempted to restore" (Schmitt *Theorie* 265). 19th century European distances made Spain fertile ground for the instinctive emergence of the partisan, while Prussia, fallow in this regard, was nonetheless the cradle of this historical figure's theoretical implications. Russia contributed the triangulation and thus the Hegelian synthesis that transformed war and its legitimation.

If battle is, in John Keegan's description, geared toward the disintegration of human groups (298), contemporary war has surmounted its 18th- and 19th-century decorum in the observation of combat's dramatic units: of action, time, and place. Since World War I the conduct of battle as a well-directed play and according to an accepted code has become obsolete. As Chris Hedges puts it, "Redemption, since World War I, comes to us only through Apocalypse" (85). And Apocalypse is not a contained event but one at the limit of time and human meaning. After the initial battles of World War I, it became clear that a decision was not forthcoming and the armies had to be constantly supplied with fresh troops, making mass mobilization necessary. As a result civilians, especially women, had to be recruited to staff the factories that produced the material for the war, and every branch of the national economies, from agriculture to transportation and finance had to be hitched to the war effort of every belligerent country. Soon the distinction between combatants and non-combatants became untenable, as the bulk of a country's resources were committed to the war. It was again a German who drew the logical inferences from that kind of war. Erich Lundendorff, First Quartermaster General after July 1916, a nomination that gave him virtual dictatorial powers over the war effort, believed that the German government had not thrown sufficient resources into the war, which could otherwise have been won. In 1936 he published *Der Totale Krieg*, an anti-Clausewitzian work in which the author reversed the classical formula by claiming that under modern conditions politics had to be made a continuation of war, and war was nothing less than a national struggle for survival with no limits or exclusions. Politics as a continuation of war meant that war was the normal state of affairs and military purpose the reason of state. In ominous anticipation of the war that Germany was busy preparing,

Ludendorff discarded the distinction between government, army and people; discarded, in effect, the basis for Weber's modern form of legitimation.

The wars of the 20th century reached the limits of the *ius ad bellum* or legitimation of violence through the national state. Once the concept of total war had been activated, entire societies could be held responsible for unleashing Apocalypse. By pulling all the stops and sucking every citizen into the war effort, 20th century states broke down the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, removing the philosophical endorsement for the legal monopoly on violence. The present situation is characterized by the reappearance of primitive forms of violence targeting society indiscriminately: any member, anytime, anywhere. Terrorism not only revokes the *ius in bello* but "democratizes" the *ius ad bellum* when groups of any political or religious persuasion appropriate the right to violence. The state is a relatively recent contraption and it was not until the Treaty of Westfalia (1648) established the concept of state sovereignty that European states were able to appeal to something like an internationally recognized monopoly on legal violence. From the viewpoint of this convention, terrorism is associated with criminality rather than warfare on the basis of its breach of legality, but that legality (to the extent that one speaks of international and not merely domestic law, which is impotent to properly define the terms of a civil conflict) has been eroding for some time, as state sovereignty dissipates under global pressures. These pressures, which originate in the intensity and penetration of economic activity, are responsible not only for states' loss of autonomy but also for the dwindling differentiation between government and business, and for the transformation of national armies into professional organizations at the service of private patrons and multinational corporations. Terrorism going global is less a response to the globalization of power than a strategy inherent in the current transformations.

Terrorism, to the extent that it can find a historical precedent in military theory, harks back to the emergence of the partisan in the Spanish war against Napoleon. In Spain itself that new modality of waging war (thoroughly criminal from the viewpoint of international law at the time) did not immediately prompt a transformation of legitimacy. Not until the 1850s and 60s was the popular war identified with revolutionary patriotism in poems like Bernardo López García's "A los heroes del 2 de mayo," but then in the context of civil war that stalled the issue of legitimacy in long-drawn dynastic strife. Strategist B.H. Liddell Hart remarked that "The Peninsular War was an outstanding historical example, achieved by instinctive common sense even more than by intention, of the type of strategy which a century later [T.E.] Lawrence evolved into a reasoned theory, and applied in practice—although without so definite a fulfillment" (137). Success in the Peninsular War was certainly achieved by intuition, but the theory followed closely upon the example, although not in Spain. It was in Germany that the political consequences of the guerrilla war were drawn for theory, and in Germany that, through a dialectical reversal (in Ludendorff's anti-Clausewitzian treatise), total war was theorized and eventually launched.

The state's attempt to monopolize violence is coming to an end. Advanced states are replacing their national armies with professional organizations and recruits with mercenaries on term contract. But this is not yet the full privatization of war. Professional armies are still maintained with public moneys and equipped with the products of industry that, although nominally private, actually requires the labor of vast numbers of people in research, infrastructure, and transportation; people who are either public workers or work privately for the public sphere. As long as the modern form of legitimation holds, terrorism will draw its self-bestowed legitimacy from the overlap between government and civil society. And state responses to terrorism will inevitably rely on the same or similar methods to those used by the terrorists. While states predicate their monopoly on legal violence on the conditions established at the Treaty of Westfalia and reaffirmed at the Congress of Vienna, in practice they combat terrorism by disregarding state sovereignty and crossing borders in military or police operations, in the process conflating combatants with non-combatants, a distinction that the new forms of conflict make it difficult to sustain. Thus, as Martin van Creveld asserts, "he who fights terrorists for any period of time is likely to become one himself" (201).

The passing away of the modern form of legitimation, which arose simultaneously with the national state, may bring about a condition of chronic violence as was familiar to the pre-modern state. Practices such as capturing civilians for ransom or blackmailing entire groups of people are making a come back. As Van Creveld warns: the existing belief system, enshrined in international law, ensures that these individuals or groups receive diplomatic or, if circumstances permit, military protection. But as he points out, continuity of "low-intensity conflict" will probably generate another attitude and higher tolerance of violence. "It is the essence of low-intensity conflict that it drives down the threshold of 'political significance,' so to speak, from the level of the state to that of the organizations, groups, and individuals that comprise the state" (203). This means, simply, that the absolute violence theorized by Clausewitz as the unadulterated essence of war and espoused by Ludendorff under the notion of total war has now been expropriated and reconceptualized on a small scale, so that any terrorist cell or criminal organization can deploy it to target anything and anyone as a political metonymy for the state it cannot otherwise reach.

While French strategists like Antoine-Henri Jomini were busy planning war on a grand scale (in his *Précis des grandes operations de guerre*), Spanish guerrillas undermined the greatest conventional armed forces with illegitimate violence deployed on a small scale and without any of the appurtenances of a regular army. "Such conflict—says van Creveld—is to conventional warfare what the Einsteinian worldview is to the Newtonian" (207). What this revolution brought about in respect of legitimation, we have discussed above, but the globalization of the partisan and the proliferation of low-intensity conflict as a limited form of the total war (for the terrorist everything is a target and for the

state every method is valid to combat the terrorist) raises the question: what kind of legitimation will underwrite the new forms of authority?

In the future, Weber's tripartite model could be superseded. With the undermining of national sovereignty and the gradual disappearance of borders as meaningful delimitation of the sphere for the monopoly on legitimate violence, it seems unlikely that the state will endure in the form that emerged in the 17th century. In this case legitimation by legal statute and subjective persuasion based on patriotism would almost certainly decline. A return to traditional legitimation through theocracy or patrimonial authority seems unlikely, at least in the Western, secularized world. But what about charisma? Could this be the principle on which the emerging powers will claim loyalty, as society fragments into interest groups led by strong personalities? Perhaps, but it is hard to imagine that if such forms of leadership arise they will not be subject to some form of bureaucratic control, such as even organized crime has produced. The Soviet regime set up an overblown personality cult at the same time that it built the largest bureaucratic state the world has known. But its legitimation was based neither on the leader's charisma nor on the size and inefficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus, but on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, that is, on the so-called scientific analysis of history.

Science, or more accurately techno-science, a self-superseding and conveniently self-obsolent set of beliefs turned into normative dogma, could be the future form of legitimation. This new political *nomos* seems to be already well on its way, aided by that other form of scientific analysis: statistics. But to say this is not enough, because it presupposes relatively cohesive forms of social administration, which may simply not be there in the future, or if they are there, then without a sufficient hold on society. Perhaps the 19th-century Spanish people furnished an anticipation of how the world will function in the future. The guerrillas produced charismatic figures like El Empecinado, but they coordinated their actions through local juntas. Similarly, a highly fragmented and loosely organized distribution of authority could be how loyalties will be claimed in the future. If so, then, legitimation could explode into a myriad forms, each tailored to the group that is capable of instituting a degree of solidarity among its members.

Perhaps Weber's three modes of legitimation will reappear distorted in combinations of different proportions. To be sure, he was aware that those forms were "pure types" rarely encountered in reality, where one found instead variations, transitions, and combinations. So, although admixture, shifting and modification characterized actual rather than theoretical legitimation, the future may bring about the simultaneity of all three types in anachronistic combinations. For instance, heady returns to traditional forms of legitimation are already (or still) dominant in large parts of the world and have some track in Western societies, while statutory or rule-based legitimation enters the shady world of organized crime, where it develops its own code of conduct. Is not life in these societies overbureaucratized and subject to layer upon layer of

statutory control? At the same time, is not the fabrication of charisma the true purpose of our media-driven electoral struggles, themselves the innermost political mechanism of societies whose self-awareness remains closely tied to the modern form of legitimation? Such a future of coexisting and competing claims on social conformity would not resolve the European oscillation between centralization and dispersion, but the new structure of legitimation would be able to accommodate increasing types of loyalty. However, this advantage would be offset by the loss or at least the diminution of the state's ability to offer protection, a loss commensurate with the curtailment of its monopoly on the use of violence.

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ⁱ The term *theatrum belli* was first used by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in the early seventeenth century. The French also used the term *théâtre de la guerre* in the seventeenth century, and by the end of the century it was used verbatim in other European languages.

MODERNISM AS AESTHETICS IN THE HISTORY OF ART

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The twentieth century has passed and the new millennium started. We know from history that new periods often begin in an atmosphere of apocalyptic unrest and therefore open the door wide to irrational ideas and acts, and enable the growth of mysticisms of any every kind. The modern age, which began with the radical demand for a rational even scientific judgment of everything in the natural world as well as in the interior life of humans, has ended. At first glance it seems paradoxical, but this end has come with the contrast of modern rationalism: the completely irrational. In spite of that, or precisely for that reason, we have to reconsider the phenomenon named Modernism from the very beginning. Modernism as the central issue of the 20th Century. Nevertheless, we are aware of the fact that the period of art history, and the broader historical period, known under the name Modernism, did not stop. Today, an account of this period is needed. We have to finally answer the question: in what aesthetic and historical time are we were living? We simply owe this to ourselves. And it is possible to answer this question. Two centuries have passed since the philosopher Friedrich Hegel spoke about the end of art in his famous lectures on aesthetics. Today, we can say, without any doubt, that he detected the historical end of such a category as represented in the term *gesamtkunstwerk* and, along with that, the end of a specific type in the development of cyclic stylistic formations. Following Hegel's revelation, we can trace some proto-modern phenomena that ruined the dogmatic power of style, iconography, and even more, undermined the very core, the consensual social background to the creation of art and the historical conception of art in its totality. Finally, all three key elements in the great triangle, the three key drivers in the process that produces art —THE MYTH (OR THE SACRAL) on the top, THE SERVANT TO THE MYTH (THE COMMITTEE) and THE ARTIST (both at the bottom of the triangle)—have been brought to their total collapse. The break with past centuries brought by these new phenomena, in art as in society, brings forward again the idea that Modernism represents a comprehensive historical phenomenon of the new type, a phenomenon that acted not only in the sphere of aesthetics but scooped up totally the patterns of life in the great part of the world and change them to their roots. Specifically, concerning artistic Modernism, we can observe how the processes of division separated the broad flow of art into more and more narrow and marginal streams, as well as into dead backwaters. At the same time, Modernism is a unique complex that cyclically experiences its own denial, its own rebellion in the form of radical acts and statements of avant-gardes, neo avant-gardes, and finally retro-gardes, and again and again the various individual, artistic withdrawals from convention—all of it, in fact, compromising Modernism. But at the same time, what is most significant is that

Modernism was able to turn to its own benefit all of these rebellions and crises, with all of their achievements, whether artistic or ethical in nature. As in a big melting pot, Modernism was able to stir these various rebellions together, to cast them into something that future generations will probably recognise, beyond all the differences, as the style of 20th century.

To our generation, however, Modernism looks like a barely-contained crowd of movements and orientations. The huge, even irreconcilable, differences among them are recognised as large oscillations among artists' personal developments and stylistic changes. There were many dilemmas between the mimetic and the abstract, the key borderlines of modernist interests that have led to completely hermetic, private mythologies or esoteric sub-cultures. We believe that future generations will not be so sensitive to the differences. They will possess a calm and broader view, without so much emotion. Many things that seem today huge and significant will be seen in changed dimensions and more credible positions, among other comparable phenomena, in the light that only that passing of time can bring. The common characteristics of Modernism will emerge more clearly; the fields where it was really successful and where it failed will be judged much more indulgently than today. But even so, Modernism in art, with so many formal appearances, will not be easy to frame into such simplified categories as style, which art historians have been so successful in using when dealing with historical styles like the classical, Romanesque, Gothic or Baroque. Modernism in art, as a part of broader historical Modernism, is essentially different from other historical styles—its nature depends completely on the new order of thinking. After thousands of years of artistic creation, the modernistic work of art was born in completely secular circumstances, liberated from all mythical limitations on the committer. Modernist art was created in the frame of total artistic freedom. This statement, of course, is not new, but in the frame of this essay it is important to stress its historical meaning: the liberation of the artistic subject was one of the most important emancipations among the many that have happened in the last two centuries. Every emancipation means struggle, division, conflict and resignation. It means frustrations, which grow larger as investments and expectations are put into a certain emancipation (and the modern age is the age of great expectations)—and then even larger when the "liberated" face the poor results of their emancipation.

The first point of reference for the aesthetic of Modernism is, as already stressed, the liberated artistic subject. We can follow the first steps of this long-lasting process from the end of middle ages. The process did not go on unobserved, but it passed without significant discussion – it passed in some way under the surface of social development, until the second part of 18th century, when the last known *gesamkunstwerk* was produced. This is when the new artist of Romanticism emerged, with his new contradictory bearing of, on the one side, a heroic rebel and, on the other, a resigned, defeated individual. This bearing revealed on the surface the ultimate decline of the inner tie so vitally important for *gesamtkusntwerk*—the tie of the artist to both the

central mythical issue and to the committer. There is nothing more significant for the time which I call proto-modernism than the belief that the lost mythical, central point should be replaced by the new myth. The creation of this myth brought a conscious, rational intervention into something that was, up to that time, something of a natural social condition, the artist's self-understood framing of himself within thousands of years of consecutive social and cultural formations. The radical intervention was the idea of the Nation, and this installation of the Nation into the vacant mythical centre stimulated a series of new activities in the arts, culture, and particularly in historical sciences. Nationalism as a new political power came onto the historical cultural stage.

A similar idea at the mythical centre, of Man as social subject caught in an everlasting class struggle, also influenced a response in politics and culture, but this idea could not avoid the same or even worse historical consequences. The newborn national states, the empires with their classes, the economies and ideologies ran into at least two world wars of apocalyptic dimensions. The historical stage filled with more and more political and economical systems, with more and more interlaced interests and relationships, while at the same time the artistic and cultural scene glided along the social margin. The artist there remained alone, standing on unsteady ground without anything or anyone to grasp—without any significant social role. True, this situation enabled him to declare himself as the ultimate legislator in art and made him willing to take the whole risk of this decision. But he then faced the truth that his legislator's rule ended at the edges of his own artistic domain. His sovereignty over the field of his artistic innovations was not respected even by the producers of mass culture. The right of legislator was in fact limited by the boundaries of his own range of action. Rather than reaching wider, he instead turned inward. The beginning of Modernism its continuation and its culmination in the time of the first historical avant-gardes passed in the sign of the new artist's position. That means in the sign of simultaneous existence of his total artistic liberty without any social protection faced to the broad field of formal and topic choices. Interaction of these two key artistic condition elements increased and concentrated the majority of artist's decisions within himself. The artist's wounded being became the uniquely valid topic of his art. As if in a broken curved mirror, in which was reflected the fragmented and distorted picture of reality, a new and exclusive set of aesthetic criteria emerged again and again with every new work of art. The image of the world, therefore, could not depend on external, non-artistic phenomena, or on competent ruling elites in the society, or even on the art market. The only relevant actions in art took parallel, subversive routes, which could not be controlled, not even when state authorities tried to impose the dictates of an ordered aesthetics. But, if it seemed that they were successful in such attempts, they did not last too long.

In the 2nd part of the 19th century, Paris bourgeois society was witness to a paradigmatic artistic event named the *salon des refusées* that ultimately revealed the assumed fact of two or more parallel artistic activities. I studied art history at the time when the argument prevailed that the line of Modernism emerged directly from the

salon des refuses. Supporters of Modernism did not care for anything else that had happened on parallel tracks, say the so-called official art commissioned by the ruling elites or by the Church. But was there a possible alternative artistic subject? How to explain the interest of today's scholars and researches in this so-called official art and the perhaps even greater interest of architectural theorists in the historicist architecture of the 19th century: a style that was looked down upon by orthodox Modernists twenty or thirty years ago as non-inventive, and therefore not at all original? The orthodox Modernists put forward their view of modern architecture as more advanced—of course, with its victorious aesthetics based upon new the constructions of utilitarian buildings and machines. But Modernism of 19th and 20th century is double-faced if not poly-faced, filled with various streams of art, and far from any one prevailing aesthetic definition. If we took the former, exclusive standpoint of a unified Modernism and a single modernistic aesthetics, we would practically renounce the theoretical basis for a judgement of the great part of art and architecture in 19th century. We would renounce the possible modernistic interpretation of the historical styles of 19th century and the similar phenomena in plastic arts so in 19th century as in 20th that in the eyes of the orthodox modernists had even no excuse to exist. From their narrow aesthetic viewpoint, loudly proclaimed as universally valid, they renounce any impure phenomena as having the possible character of modernity. I have in my mind the aggression and exclusiveness of so important movement in architecture that represents the CIAM group. Finally, can we observe the postmodern movement— a break and a radical opposition to Modernism, as some theoreticians have understood it—as proof of the latent coexistence of different streams within the broad modernistic flow, even the streams based on classical tradition? When the power of one modernistic stream momentarily weakened, another stepped forward and fought with the same vehemence to prevail. The right to be on top of one or another, or maybe it is better to talk of making the popular top list, should be left to the judgement of marketing advertisers and trend-making critics. The serious theoretician would neglect such a view and, without any prejudice, study the whole, widely spread range of artistically valid phenomena in the last two centuries in order to come closer to something what I consider as the most important task of the moment, to make the outline of the common theory of Modernism. Artistic and cultural research should go far beyond the narrow limits of art and culture in order to deepen the considerations of the wide range of modern phenomena, especially the ways of production, technological and social development, and the latent contradiction at the genesis of modern societies: the democratic versus the totalitarian. It is expected that, among the different modern phenomena, a major correlation will be recognised in the simultaneous flow of parallel processes with contradictory orientations. At the same time, we will recognize that there was no simple correlation between artistic processes and social and political formations. After all, I believe that the art theory of Modernism should be written autonomously, meaning that we should take a firm standpoint from the perspective of art theory and, from there, observe the social, political, and economic—in one word, the historical environment of the art of

Modernism. In this paper I should like to mark some possible starting points and working guidelines.

1. How Modernism is tied to history? At first glance, the question seems paradoxical. In our ears there is still a school teaching that Modernism is everything beyond historical. And didn't the avant-gardes demand that their contemporaries (modernists) radically cut all ties with the past? Naturally, they found just in this point the reason why they turned their critical sting even against, in their opinion, the compromised modernists. And yet, this demanded cut from the past, in the spirit of avant-garde radical statements and actions, proved to be Utopian. Towards the end of 20th century the postmodernists were much more cautious at that point. But in the 19th century the demand for a strict scientific view to history prevailed. As for the sphere of art in the great part of the century, artists and architects accepted the belief that history was a criterion for actions in the present. In spite of the imperative for a scientific approach to the history, the common view of particular national histories was mostly romantic, that means delighted, without necessary critical distance. In that atmosphere, the artist and theoreticians believed that they could bring to life again the historical styles and fully experience them. They succeeded in some way, but just in the frame of one artist's act, just in a single work of art or architecture... If we put a series of such quasi-architectural reconstructions into the context of an existing urban structure, what do we get? The modern patchwork: with its possibility of moving from one style to another, from one historical period to another. And the present observer, standing at the beginning of 21st century, can reach an even more striking conclusion: the 20th century was totally obsessed by history. Film and television production, with the expanded possibility of choice among different channels, made the opportunities to move from one historical representation to another even more convincing and much more comfortable, since there is no need even to move from your chair. The core of the problem is hidden right here: would it be possible to move smoothly from one historical period to another, from one cultural formation to another, with the simple press of the remote control button, if the common supposition of the (art) producers in common knowledge of historical data and processes, better to say of common historical *cliches* of all that, made by the same moving pictures media would not exist. They simply do not expect any trouble when viewers make their quick leaps from one historical time and space to another. The next question that should be thoroughly studied in the future is to explain the role of the mass historical conscience in Modernism as a general historical complex. The historical avant-gardes strictly refused any historical ties, any search for historical models. They wanted to be radically finished with all historical art and, on the scene of the fire, to build their own artistic structure. Today the common belief of scholars and researchers is that this was one of many Utopias of historical avant-gardes and at the same time one of their projects directed into the far future. The neo avant-gardes that emerged in the sixties of the last century established a more balanced view to history as to the future. The last avant-garde movements (in this case I have the direct experience in the Slovenian art scene), which call themselves retro-

gardes, introduced many new and different creative methods and processes and drastically put together for instance Malevič's suprematistic images or their parts with the iconography and the *cliches* of totalitarian regimes. On the other hand, they imposed the methods and schemes of the historical avant-gardes actions based on almost scientific historical researches. The idea of »remake« was born in their spiritual environment, as they tried to find a solid basis in scientific art historical or archaeological results and the reconstructions of lost works of art, especially those of the historical avant-gardes.

2. The second basic question of art, is Modernism connected with science as a whole, not only with the historical sciences? Modern sciences, as it seems, were used in Modernism as a tool for defining one of the fundamental relationships to its historical and social environment, yet with some oscillations. The problem of the relationship between art and science emerged in European art history some 500 years earlier. The humanists and renaissance artists contributed numerous results of their explorations in classical linguistics, in study of human and animal bodies, in linear perspective, etc. to the modern sciences. The most important thing for Modernism of 19th and 20th century is that the artist's tie to science became even more obligatory, insofar as scientific innovations became an important part of the dynamics of modern art. They were a latent stimulus, although some did have a direct impact on particular art streams. For instance, the scientific discovery that white light is composed by a spectrum of colours affected the destruction of the complex colour surface of the painting into colour spot composition (by the pointillists for instance). Sigmund Freud's discovery of unconscious stimulated the so-called automatic writing in literature and in painting. There are numerous influences of science on art, from the discovery of photography and film to later discoveries in physics and astronomy, computer technologies, etc. Generally, the discoveries and in many cases their speculative interpretations reached different levels of art production very quickly. In principle, the abstract conception of an art work leads the artists to research the whole range of the extreme poles marked by the capacities of the telescope on one side and the microscope on the other. In addition to that are all the possible visions of the world through technical devices like photographic camera at the beginning and the television and the computer screen at the end. The technologically structured image of the world was intended to be, at the same time, its artistic transposition... We can argue that with the argument that there is more about the external than the essential influences. And of course, we can blame artists that they were not resistant to the sensational attractions of modern discoveries and their non-reflected and irresponsible responses as well. In this paper I would like to stress the importance of thorough research of these obvious long-lasting ties. Future researchers should pay special attention to the differences in artists and scientist way of thinking and the real nature of scientific and artistic creative processes if there are any at all. An analysis of the typical, modernistic way of observing will show the method of viewing parts and fragments of the real, or viewing from the edge, the discovery and interpretation of facts, and the definition of mental processes in research categories (now it is hard to find

a modern art work without some art research input). Art has adopted the image of a scientifically led process and, finally, even represents itself as pseudoscience.

3. What is the relationship between Modernism and the avant-garde? This relationship should be carefully reconsidered again since their active coexistence proved that this is not only the key aesthetic question in the development of the both art poles, but also that the split of Modernism and avant-garde proved to be essential to the whole development of art in 20th century. Let me explain. The phenomenon of the rise of the avant-garde makes Modernism unique in the whole previous history of art and stylistic formations. As for the avant-garde itself I take the side of those researchers and theorists who do not see in the avant-garde's movements and actions simply more radically formulated modern ideas but recognise in them a totally new quality. In their activities avant-gardes follow their own rules. Their self-reflexion is different. They introduce different artistic methods and they search for the different goals in art. In short, I see in the avant-gardes a special formation that is conscious of their different position. They radically step out of Modernism and resist it as violently as they would resist other phenomena in the society that they recognise as harmful. The artistic avant-garde means a step out of Modernism, a radical break with Modernism. But should it emerge without Modernism. Definitely not! The modern age, being burdened with the whole complexity of class divisions, market pressures, social alienation etc. pushes the artistic subject into the class of expropriators, leading eventually to avant-garde rebellion. This is reflected in the radicalisation of the formal artistic elements in trans-medial activities, non-traditional artistic acts and methods up to the suspension of the work of art as the traditional product of artistic activity. In the ultimate consequence, it is summarized with the motto: "the artist lives his life in the way of art". The classical aesthetic criterion vanishes and in its place an ethics of artistic behaviour takes the stage. At this point the question of the status of the work of art, one of the central issues of Modernism, is escalated to its extreme. Many artists, today considered as classics of Modernism, launched this discussion at different occasions in the public as well. So the avant-garde is closely related to Modernism, it however also breaks from Modernism. In a relatively short time, it burned the candle at both ends and extinguished itself. Its achievements were immediately or in some time later absorbed by the wide circle of modernist movements, artists, designers, film-makers, advertisers, television producers and many, many others. The avant-gardes in fact took the role of art laboratories, then the role of huge accelerators of research of formal, meaningless, ethical and other aspects of works of art. If avant-gardes acted in groups, we have to add to them a whole series of private laboratories of individual artists. But we should not observe them only in the role of inventors of new forms, suitable for the always-hungry market for new art ideas. They also took the role of sensitive researchers in themselves, incorruptible creators of a new art morality for themselves and for the others. In every new generation of modernists the same such questions (the status of an artist, the status of an art work, status of art in whole, the meaning of art in Modernism...) occupied in great part their public activities.

4. The historical genesis of Modernism should be studied again from the very beginning. For a better start, clear criteria should be imposed in order to draw the line between the modern and the proto-modern. From the definition of basic criteria, used to recognise what is modern and what is proto-modern, we should eventually define the time of the Modernism's birth. In my view, Classicism and Romanticism already depend to proto-modern phenomena and we can be sure about the presence of Modernism when in art at least one of possible violations of traditional classical rules is detected. On the other hand we should comprehend Modernism as a genesis of divisions. Let us go back to the question of why at the end of 18th century the concept of *gesamtkunswerk* collapsed. What kept it together, and which element of the structure weakened, causing the *gesamtkunstwerk* to be dismembered into basic arts, into painting, sculpture and architecture. In the following age, the emancipated arts could not keep their consistency of metier and style; thus, they disintegrated into styles. If the development of historical styles in painting and sculpture is not so easy to define, the development of styles in architecture clearly indicates how the dogmatic rule of classical historical styles starts to weaken. On the other hand, it also shows the modern intent for a typological systematisation of styles, according to function. For that reason, special attention should be given to the first three decades of 20th century, since, on the one hand, the processes of modernisation of forms within historical styles continued and, on the other, architectural language leaned upon abstract tendencies in painting and sculpture accepted the imperative to simplify radically its language up to the basic geometrical forms, plain surfaces, sharp cut openings etc. or with other words: the architectural meaning and symbolic structure were degraded to the bare civil engineering technology.

5. The question of modern and pre-modern. In the mature phase of Modernism there were several ideas and attempts to deny, to diminish, and eventually to suppress all forms of the pre-modern. The historical avant-garde even increased such tendencies to include all art forms that framed, carried or supported traditional symbolic content. All forms of ritual, whether of the Church, the state, or institutions and groups, and even private ceremonies, found themselves under the stroke of modern artists' rejection, even mockery. Modernism attempted to impose its own new symbols, and it would be hard to deny some great successes in this direction. But it failed to supplant all the traditional (sometimes very old) and pre-modern influences from modern life and the accompanied art forms inevitably needed to create the ritual. The relationship between the modern and pre-modern remains controversial up to now. In their mutual exclusiveness I recognise the reasons why the majority of attempts to calm, to adjust, let's say, modern painting, sculpture, architecture to (or with) liturgical or state-ceremonial purposes, did not bring good results. It is more and more obvious that in this area Modernism was mostly unsuccessful. It does not surprise me that, for instance, in the European East, when liturgical needs are in question, they turned completely to the traditional art of painting, architecture, sculpture, applied arts... At the turn of the centuries I see no

signs that should indicate how this Modernism's try strength against pre-modern will finish.

In conclusion, I have to go back to the demand from the first part of this paper, in which I proposed to reach past the one-sided conceptions of the development of Modernism and instead distinguish the parallel lines, the lines on the margin, the results that come out from the genesis of splits and divisions that were considered as dead ends for a long time. The post-modern shift of view was needed to bring to light that the dead ends did survive and that they were indeed more valid, deeply rooted, and maybe not so distant from so called mainstream. With their re-evaluation, the new views based on the wisdom and ethics of the art disciplines came to the surface. But at the same time the inner modernistic dynamic that permanently attempts to decompose what seems to be integrated, remains decisive and increases the confusion in art that seems to have been from the theoretical point of view uncontrolled for a long, long time. It seems that we are approaching some new end: the end of modernistic and avant-garde Utopias, and the end of the conception of an integrated form that provide the discussion in plastic art categories as good quality or bad quality, about the compositional balance in the parts and in the whole. The traditional work of art, the art object, stays more and more distant in the past, and in its place, a more complex work of art enters the stage, which is difficult to define in its plastic substance. The present range of art representations that could be still put under the common name of the plastic arts long ago announced the need for a profound change of methods of critical judgement. The historical avant-gardes brought to art and art criticism the new recognition that the centre of gravity moved from aesthetical judgement (in the work of art) to ethical judgement (in the artistic action). In the last decades, the artist's ethic deepened. The work of art or its plastic representation is still presented by formal elements, but they have remained incomprehensible apart from the context of the artist's personal decisions and his private mythologies. In the end, the form, that is the art form or the form of the medium, is not sufficient. If we add to the reading of forms the structural reading, we still doubt that we are equipped enough for the complex judging of artistic contexts by their representations, especially in the light of an attempted common theory of Modernism. The formal view is made sensible by new aspects of art praxis and artistic ethics, by the new formal innovations needs the new, even out-artistic stand point if we want to experience how the hidden and deeply rooted stylistic rule of Modernism would be revealed under the surface of broad range of art languages.

Fragments de la ciutat europea

Francesc Muñoz

L'Europa del TGV, l'Europa de la revolució *low-cost*, és una Europa sense distàncies: editors de Nottingham i treballadors flexibles de Frankfurt que resideixen i teletreballen des de Mallorca o l'Adriàtic ; estudiants internacionals que a cops de bitllets barats d'avió han esdevingut una població flotant en realitat permanent a moltes ciutats; treballadors informals dels Balcans que commuten per a anar a les perifèries de Milà en viatges organitzats regularment; la presència ubiqua de l'economia global de les franquícies, que escurça les distàncies simbòliques al replicar, independentment de la semàntica del lloc, una mateixa experiència urbana arreu; i, sobretot, el turisme urbà, la gran màquina de confort que la postmodernitat ens ha deixat en herència.

La modernitat, en canvi, havia establert l'ideal de felicitat col·lectiva a partir de la visió il·lustrada sobre la salut i aquest és l'origen del procés de medicalització de les societats urbanes europees, que es desenvolupa definitivament durant el segle XX. No és gens estrany doncs el principal problema de la ciutat europea moderna no va ser un altre que la sobremortalitat urbana, que va tenir un llarg i últim episodi amb les contínues epidèmies de còlera que delmaven les poblacions urbanes europees durant el segle XIX. Aconseguit però el confort de l'esperança de vida, les noves utopies de la felicitat urbana es recolzen avui sobre la seguretat i la garantia de la mobilitat fàcil, de la victòria definitiva sobre la fricció de la distància. En el trajecte però, els fragments de paisatge urbà que coneixem es mostren més a partir del que tenen de similar i genèric que del que els fa singulars i específics.

A l'Europa sense distàncies, les transformacions de l'espai urbà son tan intenses i en tan poc temps que el paisatge deixa de representar cap permanència històrica o cultural reconeguda per a semblar-se cada vegada més a una seqüència de panoràmiques efímeres que van desapareixent, substituïdes per altres de noves, tal i com succeeix amb els objectes i experiències que consumim, els quals, en tornar-se ràpidament obsolets, son compulsivament reemplaçats per uns altres. El confort que volem, per tant, no és ja el de sentir-nos fixats a la identitat d'un lloc, sinó més aviat tot el contrari: la convivència amb una rotació d'imatges, de fragments de ciutat, que fan de la nostra identitat urbana un *patchwork* de paisatges en trànsit, una col·lecció de retalls que habitem, confortablement, en règim de *take away*.

Wozu brauchen wir in Europa noch die Nation?

Miroslav Hroch

Jede soziale Realität, die gegenwärtige, wie auch die historische, wird uns, wie heute allgemein bekannt, durch Worte vermittelt. Wenn wir also das Phänomen Nation behandeln, sollten wir dabei zwei Aspekte unterscheiden: Es ist einerseits die Ebene der realen Institutionen, Ereignisse und Handlungen und andererseits, die Ebene der Worte, der Begrifflichkeit. Dieser Unterscheidung stimmt jeder zu, nicht alle halten sich allerdings daran. Wenn ich im Thema meines Vortrags frage, wozu brauchen wir die Nation – muss ich also auch diese Frage in zwei Ebenen behandeln.

In der ersten wird es um die Begrifflichkeit gehen – das Wort, der Terminus Nation und seine Derivate –. In der zweiten wenden wir uns zur sozialen Realität: damit meine ich die soziale Grossgruppe, die als „Nation“ bezeichnet wird.

Dazu wird noch eine weitere, dritte Koordinate notwendig: die räumliche, denn wir sollten uns im Klaren darüber sein, dass der Terminus „Nation“, obwohl eine genuin europäische Erscheinung (und Terminus) heute auch in globalisierter Gestalt wirkt.

Daher möchte ich in meiner Präsentation drei grundlegende Thesen untersuchen und belegen:

Erstens, dass der Terminus Nation in verschiedenen Sprachen und Zeiten als Bezeichnung sehr unterschiedlicher historischer Situationen und sozialer Segmente gebraucht war und auch heute noch wird.

Zweitens, dass die Gemeinschaften, die wir als „Nationen“ bezeichnen, historisch bedingt sind und dass sie typologisch sehr unterschiedlich waren und bis heute noch sind.

Drittens, dass die Nation und die nationale Identität spezifisch europäische Erscheinungen sind, die später in die außereuropäische Welt „exportiert“ wurden, um dort in Koordinaten anderer Zivilisationen und Wertesysteme eine ziemlich unterschiedliche Bedeutung zu bekommen.

I. Das Eigenleben der Termini

Der Terminus Nation ist allerdings kein Wort wie jedes andere, er wird nicht nur als eine technische Bezeichnung gebraucht, wie z.B. Staat oder Ministerium oder Stadtbewohner, sondern besitzt bis heute einen gewissen Grad der Emotionalität, die oft dem üblichen Profitdenken (etwa im Sinne von „rational choice“) übergeordnet *ist*.

Es war und zum grossen Teil auch heute ist für die meisten Leute ein positives Gefühl, zu einer Nation zu gehören. Es ist als eine Ehrensache geschätzt, diese Nation zu repräsentieren und sich über ihre Erfolge – heute vor allem im Sport, Film, know how – zu freuen. Früher galt allerdings ein kategorischer Imperativ, den wir heute nur

kaum begegnen, dass man nämlich nicht nur aus der Nation zehren, sondern vor allem ihr nützlich sein soll.

Wie ist es dazu gekommen? Sicherlich, es handelt sich um ein Erbe – oder eine Last? - aus dem 19. Jahrhundert.

Manche Autoren verbinden die emotionelle Ladung des Wortes Nation mit der Grossen Französischen Revolution, andere mit Johann Gottfried Herder, andere wieder mit dem Romantismus. Allerdings, bei der Suche nach den Wurzeln müssen wir viel früher anfangen. Denn diese emotionelle Komponente hat tiefer greifende historisch-politische und auch kulturell-semantiche Wurzeln. Fangen wir mit den sprachlichen an.

Jeder weiß, dass es sich in fast allen europäischen Sprachen um ein Derivat (oder Übersetzung) vom lateinischen Substantiv NATIO handelt – und dies wieder vom Verbum nascor – also etwas, was durch die Geburt durch die Herkunft zusammenhängt.

Jeder weiß, dass „Nationes“ in den Universitäten, in den Konzilien bezeichneten aus gleicher Region stammende Menschen. Nur die Eingeweihten wissen, dass diese regionale Unterscheidung schon im späten Mittelalter manchmal auch sprachliche Zugehörigkeit berücksichtigte.

Obwohl es im Mittelalter wenig gemeinsames hatte, mit dem, was wir heute unter Nation verstehen, erlebte das Wort schon in jener Zeit eine gewisse „Nationalisierung“. Schon an der Schwelle der Neuzeit bezeichnete das Wort NATIO schon eine zum gleichen Staat gehörende Elite – und dies überlebte dann lange Jahrhunderte in Ungarn und Polen – als Natio Hungarica und Natio Polonica - also als Innbegriff der politisch privilegierten Klasse – des Adels. Außerdem wurde das Wort GENS als Bezeichnung einer auch durch sprachliche Merkmalen charakterisierte Gruppe benutzt.

Seit dem 15. und vor allem 16. Jahrhundert wurde das lateinische Wort in die sich gestaltenden nationalen Sprachen integriert und in ihnen domestiziert. Dies geschah wahrscheinlich schon seit dem Anfang an mit unterschiedlichen Konnotationen, die der politischen Situation in der jeweiligen Makroregion Europas entsprachen. Dies kann man in der Zeit der Aufklärung schon ziemlich genau belegen:

Einerseits Englische Lexica – der politischen Praxis entsprechend – verstanden English Nation als ein politisch zusammengehörendes Volk, das **staatlich** organisiert wird, und auch die Grande Encyclopedie spricht von einer Summe der Untertanen, bzw. Staatsbewohner, die unter einem Herrscher und gemeinsamen Gesetzen leben.

Andererseits im damaligen deutschen Sprachgebrauch, wird der Terminus Nation (und das Synonym Volk) durch gemeinsame **Sprache und Kultur** bestimmt. Analogisch war es übrigens auch in tschechischer und in den meisten slawischen Sprachen.

Ungeachtet dieser Unterschiede erreichte der Terminus schon während der frühen Neuzeit eine positive Deutung, verbunden etwa mit der Vorstellung der Heimat, des Vaterlandes. Die Aufklärer haben aber auch Betrachtungen vom „Nationalstolz“ publiziert. Sie haben über nationale Tugenden diskutiert, wie auch über die spezifischen Eigenschaften einzelner Nationen. Man war schon auch an der Bestimmung „nationaler Feinde“ interessiert.

Wir dürfen wohl behaupten, dass die positive Aufwertung des Terminus „Nation“ mit dem aufgeklärten Patriotismus der Gebildeten Elite genetisch verbunden war – also mit der Idee einer durch konkrete Tätigkeiten realisierte Liebe zum Vaterland und seinen Bewohnern.

Dies alles geschah Jahrzehnte vor der Großen französischen Revolution, mit der in unseren Lehrbuchkenntnissen die Glorifizierung der Nation erst anfangen sollte, um sich von dort durch Europa auszubreiten – je nach dem Standort der Autoren unterschiedlich interpretiert: war es ein Fortschritt ? oder eher eine verhängnisvolle Pestepidemie?

Doch will ich hiermit die Bedeutung der Großen Revolution keineswegs in Frage stellen. In ihr erhielt der Terminus einen neuen sozialen Inhalt in Gestalt der zivilgesellschaftlichen Dimension: die Nation bilden alle gleichberechtigte und solidarisch handelnde **Bürger**. Alle sollten dementsprechend auch zu Trägern des Fortschritts und Vorkämpfern für Freiheit in Europa werden. Durch die revolutionären Ereignisse und noch vielmehr in der Napoleonischen Zeit der „Grand Nation“ wurde das Konstrukt der Nation personalisiert, intellektualisiert, wurde zum quasi „obligatorischen“ Gemeingut.

Wenn wir also die Wurzeln jener Emotionalisierung und Verherrlichung der Nation suchen, die als typisch für die folgende Zeit eigentlich bis heute gilt, dann befinden wir uns zeitlich um eine bis zwei Generationen vor dem Auftritt des **Romantismus**. Dieser wird nämlich manchmal auch für diese Verherrlichung, für den nationalen Enthusiasmus „verantwortlich“ gemacht. Dies halte ich für ein Missverständnis. Natürlich haben die Romantiker – wenigstens einige unter ihnen – die Idee der Nation zu sich genommen und diese weiter gepflegt, sie haben sie aber weder „entdeckt“, noch erfunden. Ich vermute, dass die beiden Gefühle – die des Nationalen, wie jene des Romantischen aus gemeinsamen oder sehr nahen Wurzeln wuchsen. Dies wäre übrigens ein Interessantes Forschungsvorhaben, allerdings an dieser Stelle will ich mit diesem Hinweis nur von dieser vereinfachenden Konstruktion Abstand nehmen.

Abgesehen davon, es steht eindeutig fest, dass „die Nation“ in den Augen des 19. Jahrhunderts schon als konsensuell akzeptierter Wert an sich galt. Eine Nation zu sein – das war etwas ehrenhaftes, Prestige bringendes, aber zugleich für alle ihre Mitglieder verpflichtendes.

Die deutsche, magyarische, tschechische, norwegische Nation etablierten sich schon am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts als Objekte einer liebevollen Pflege.

Zugleich war die Existenz als Nation auch etwas, was nicht jede Gruppe in Anspruch nehmen durfte. Eben, weil es so vornehm war.

Es entsprach dem herrschenden Historismus des europäischen 19. Jahrhunderts, dass die Nation als eine **historische** Erscheinung verstanden war, d.h. „perennialistisch“, wie man heute sagt. Und da nur politische Geschichte im damaligen Verständnis als eine relevante Geschichte galt, hieß es, dass ein Anspruch darauf, Nation zu sein, ohne Geschichte keine Wirkung hatte: Die Unterscheidung der „historischen“ und „nichthistorischen“ Nationen war schon 1848 Gegenstand heftiger politischer Diskussionen in Mitteleuropa.

War die historisch belegte mittelalterliche Staatlichkeit eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, als Nation anerkannt zu werden? Wo sind aber dann die zeitlichen Maßstäbe einer noch tolerierbaren Unterbrechung dieser Staatlichkeit?

Parallel dazu bekamen die traditionellen Unterschiede in der Konnotation des Wortes eine immer größere Relevanz.

Mit der Etablierung der positivistischen Wissenschaft wollte man durch „objektive“ Kriterien bestimmen, was eine Nation ist und was sie nicht ist.

Dies alles verlief im Zeichen des scholastischen „Realismus“: man glaubte daran, dass der Begriff real existiert, dass es eine „wahre“ Nation gibt, es gilt nur, diese wissenschaftlich zu definieren.

Die erste Erschütterung dieses Glaubens kam mit der subjektivistischen Deskription einer Nation durch das **Nationalbewusstsein** ihrer Mitglieder. Diese Auffassung vertrat nicht nur der oft zitierte Ernest Renan, sondern auch die theoretisch denkenden deutschen Statistiker jener Zeit.

Die zweite Erschütterung – heute leider schon fast vergessen – kam am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts mit Otto Bauers (der führende Austromarxist) Ansicht, dass man historisch mehrere Stufen, und daher auch mehrere Typen der Nation unterscheiden muss – von einer adeligen, über die Nation der Stadtbürger und Intellektuellen bis zur Nation des kapitalistischen Zeitalters.

Erst in der Zeit, wo der Streit um Definition der Nation auf volle Touren lief, betrat ein neuer Terminus den politischen (vorerst nicht den wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs – der „**Nationalismus**“. Es war ein Wort ohne Vergangenheit, ein Neologismus also, gleich aber emotionell belastet: für einige – z.B. in Frankreich – ein positives Gefühl, für andere – vor allem Sozialdemokraten und Pazifisten – eine Gefahr für die Menschheit. Diese Vorstellung schien dann durch die im Namen der Nation verübten Brutalitäten des 1. Weltkrieg bestätigt.

So oder so bewertet, es ist verständlich, dass mit der sich immer stärker Ausbreitenden subjektiven Auffassung der Nation der Terminus „Nationalismus“ auch in die Sprache der Wissenschaft immer erfolgreicher penetrierte – insbes. nach dem 2. Weltkrieg. Nebenbei, ich betrachte es im kontinentalen Kontext als ein Kuckucksei der anglo-sächsischen Forschung.

Das Wort verselbständigte sich und wurde in das 19. Jahrhunderts rückwärts projiziert, bei einigen Autoren (wie z.B. Ernst Gellner) sogar zum „Schöpfer“ der Nation ernannt.

Es gibt wenige so deutliche Beispiele dafür, wie sich ein Wort von der Realität loslösen und diese autoritär bestimmen und kategorisieren kann.

Ich halte es für überflüssig, an dieser Stelle gegen den gedankenlosen Gebrauch dieses Terminus zu polemisieren. Es genügt wohl nur darauf hinzuweisen, dass bei der Mehrzahl der Autoren unter dem „Nationalismus“ alle Stellungnahmen, Aktivitäten und Institutionen verstanden werden, die etwas mit der Nation zu tun haben, oder dies als ihre Absicht deklarieren. Es bleibt dann aber noch offen, was man sich unter dieser „Nation“ vorstellen soll.

Es ist begrüßenswert, dass während der letzten Zeit immer mehr Autoren den Nationalismus in ihrem wissenschaftlichen Instrumentarium marginalisiert – und Termini, wie nationale Identität, Nationalbewusstsein, Zugehörigkeit benutzt. Ich schließe mich jener Minderheit der Forscher, die den Terminus im engeren, negativen Sinne verstehen – nämlich als einen hasserfüllten nationalen Egoismus, Chauvinismus etc.

II. Europäische Nation entstand ohne „Nationalismus“

Die höchste Zeit jetzt, die Ebene der Worte zu verlassen und die Ebene der sozialen und kulturellen Realität zu betreten. Zugegeben: mein Ausgangspunkt ist die empirisch belegbare Tatsache, dass die meisten europäischen Gemeinschaften, deren Mitglieder sich als „Nation“ bezeichneten, sich – abgekürzt gesagt – während der Modernisierung als bürgerliche Gesellschaften etablierten: die entstehende moderne Industriegesellschaft brauchte es, neu strukturiert zu werden.

Erlauben Sie mir an dieser Stelle ein vielleicht gewagtes Gedankenspiel: stellen wir uns vor, dass wir bei der Untersuchung der mit der Moderne antretenden Reformen, Erschütterungen und sozialen Transformationen das Wort „Nation“ nicht kennen (und um so weniger den „Nationalismus“).

An der Schwelle der neuzeitlichen Geschichte aller europäischen Regionen im West und Ost – also etwa zwischen Mitte des 18. und Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts – finden wir eine Periode, wo die Welt des spätf feudalen *ancien regims* allmählich oder abrupt zusammenbrach. Die alten traditionellen Bindungen und Abhängigkeiten wurden angefochten oder sogar aufgelöst, die traditionelle Produktion in der Landwirtschaft und in den städtischen Zünften war durch die Manufaktur – und Industrieproduktion beschädigt, bzw. gezwungen, neue Wege zu suchen, neue Entscheidungen zu treffen. Die alte Welt des patrimonialen, bzw. seigneurialen Systems war immer weniger allumfassend, die ständischen Barrieren durchlässiger. Die religiöse Legitimierung der privilegierten Autoritäten war immer öfter in Frage gestellt, daher auch die traditionellen Wertsysteme angezweifelt. Immer mehr Menschen übertraten oder verließen den Rahmen dieser alten patriarchalischen Welt, zu welcher die Generationen ihrer Vorfahren gehörten: einerseits durch Arbeitssuche, andererseits durch höhere Bildung. Die Idee der Gleichheit aller Menschen setzte sich andererseits allmählich durch. Diese Prozesse verliefen in verschiedenen Regionen Europas in ungleicher Zeit – also asynchron.

Die Folge war eine Identitätskrise und Verunsicherung und daher stammende – vor allem unter den Gebildeten – Suche nach neuen Sicherheiten und Zugehörigkeiten, und vor allem nach neu formulierten humanistischen Wertsystemen. Nachdem die Identität mit der traditionellen Dorf – oder Stadtgemeinschaft nicht stark genug wirkte oder sogar unerreichbar wurde, nachdem die religiöse Legitimität der Privilegien und der Monarchie angezweifelt wurde – da stellte sich die Frage, wohin sollte man in dieser „entzauberten Welt“ gehören?

Wenn die Leute nicht mehr als ungleich durch Geburt galten, lag es auf der Hand, dass sie früher oder später keine Untertanen in der ständisch und hierarchisch gegliederten Welt sind, sondern gleichberechtigte Mitglieder einer arbeitsteiligen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Mit der steigenden sozialen Mobilität und der sich entfaltenden Verwaltung und Bürokratisierung stieg auch die Intensität der sozialen Kommunikation, die den Rahmen der traditionellen Dorf – und Stadtgemeinde weit übertraten. Dabei konnte jeder durch tagtägliche Erfahrung feststellen, dass es einfacher ist, mit jenen Mitmenschen zu kommunizieren, die ein ihm verständliches Dialekt sprachen, also je nach dem sozialen Status sein Vernacular, bzw. seine Schriftsprache benutzten. Diese Erfahrung war umso lehrreicher, sofern die Menschen durch den sich schnell oder langsam ausbreitenden Schulbesuch imstande waren, sich eine Großzahl von Menschen vorzustellen, die gewisse Gemeinsamkeiten besaßen, sei es, sie lebten unter dem gleichen Herrscher, sie bewohnten dasselbe historische Land und hatten daher eine gemeinsame Vergangenheit, sie sprachen gegenseitig verständliche Sprache.

So entstand, oder vielleicht aktivierte sich – vorerst in den Köpfen einer Gebildeten Minderheit – ein Erkenntnis, dass die alte Gesellschaft allmählich zerfällt. Dieser Zerfall erschien ihnen als eine Umgestaltung oder Zergliederung der ständischen Zustände in eine arbeitsteilige Gemeinschaft, deren Mitglieder gleiche Rechte haben, sich untereinander besser verstehen, haben ein gemeinsames Schicksal, gemeinsame Interessen und können auch gegenseitig solidarisch wirken. Diese Vision stützte sich auf ein anderes, schon existierendes aufgeklärtes Konzept des Vaterlandes, dem jeder Gebildete nützlich sein soll – also ein Konzept des schon erwähnten aufklärerischen Patriotismus. Es bestanden (und realisierten sich) verschiedene Möglichkeiten konkreter politischen Gestalt dieser Gemeinschaft: manchmal verwirklichte sich der Weg durch eine konstitutionelle Monarchie, eventuell hatte diese Monarchie starke religiös motivierte Züge der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, Manchmal endete der Weg in einem revolutionär gestalteten konstitutionellen Staat – als Monarchie oder als Republik. Die Formen konnten also unterschiedlich sein, aber **es gab keine Alternative** zu dieser neuen Gestaltung der sozialen Organisation (d.h. wir kennen keine andere Variante der modernen Gemeinschaft).

Und erst an dieser Stelle erlauben Sie mir den Terminus auf die Bühne zu bringen, der Ihnen schon sowieso vorschwebt: die NATION. Dieser Terminus lebte, wie schon gesagt, im Gebrauch aller damaligen Literatursprachen in Europa und besaß eine positive Konnotation – obwohl im ungleichen Kontext: mal mit der Heimat, mal mit politischer Macht, mit Unabhängigkeit, mit feudalen Privilegien, Freiheit des Einzelnen, bzw. mit Schutz vor äußerer Unterdrückung. Nur in einigen Sprachen existierte noch ein alternativer Terminus – wie „das Volk“ im Deutschen, auch dies allerdings als ein Positivum verstanden. Die NATION war also ursprünglich kein voraus vorbereitetes Programm, kein Projekt, nach dem man die Gesellschaft zu reorganisieren hätte, aber es passte bestens zur Bezeichnung jener neuen Realität, die ich eben charakterisiert habe.

Damit soll jedoch nicht geleugnet werden, dass es während des 19. Jahrhunderts auch einen **kulturellen „Transfer“** gab, als sich, gewissermaßen verspätet, neue

nationale Bewegungen formierten, die das Model der schon bestehenden Nation folgten, bzw. zu folgen beabsichtigten. Selbst hier in Katalonien beobachtet man einen Wandel von „Regionalisten“ vor 1900 zu „Nationalisten“ nach 1900. Es gab sogar einige Fälle in Europa, wo man in eigener Sprache erst das der Nation entsprechende Abstraktum neu schaffen, neu erfinden musste („kanssa“ in finnischer Sprache).

Was sollte durch dieses ungewöhnliche Gedankenspiel erreicht werden?

Erstens wollte ich damit illustrieren, dass für den nationalen Formierungsprozess in Europa solche Bedingungen existierten, die wir in anderen Teilen der Welt nicht finden.

Zweitens und vor allem wollte ich demonstrieren, dass irgendeine Idee der neu zu schaffenden Nation und um so weniger der sog. Nationalismus keineswegs als ein „primus movens“ in jenem Prozess auftreten, den ich als Formierung moderner Nationen bezeichne. Das schließt allerdings nicht aus, dass die NATION später zum kulturellen, ja sogar ethischen Wert an sich gehoben wurde, zum verbindlichen Prinzip des solidarischen Lebens. Die Voraussetzungen dafür waren schon im aufgeklärten Patriotismus quasi vorprogrammiert. Der patriotische Aufklärer betrachtete es als seine Pflicht, für das in seinem Vaterlande lebende Volk nützlich zu werden, was allerdings nicht bedeutete, dass er sich mit diesem Volke identifizieren musste. Der moderne Patriot identifizierte sich schon mit „seinem“ Volke. Diese ethische Wende drückte sich früher oder später in der Begrifflichkeit des Nationalen aus. Infolge dessen erschien dann unter den oben geschilderten Bedingungen der Identitätskrise den patriotisch gesinnten Gebildeten der Terminus „national“ am besten geeignet für die Bezeichnung neuer Identität.

Bisher bewegte ich mich in einer allzu abstrakten Ebene und es ist die höchste Zeit nachzuprüfen, inwiefern die empirische **historische Realität** dieser Theorie entsprach. Gleich am Anfang soll festgestellt werden, dass die Realität der nationalen Formierungsprozesse nicht nur – wie schon gesagt – zeitlich differenziert war, sondern auch, dass sie unterschiedliche soziale und politische Inhalte besaß.

Der elementare Unterschied bestand darin, dass sich in einigen Fällen die moderne Nation durch die innere Umgestaltung des schon seit Jahrhunderten bestehenden Staates mit eigener herrschenden Klasse, homogenen Hochkultur und Schriftsprache formierte, in anderen dann unter Bedingungen einer Nation-in-spe, einer Vision, die sich durch nationale Bewegung zu verwirklichen suchte. Zur Exemplifizierung dieser beiden legitimen Typen der Nationsbildung stellen wir uns die Karte Europas an der Schwelle des 19. Jahrhunderts vor.

Wir finden hier einerseits einige wenige Staaten, die fast monoethnisch waren: Frankreich, Niederlande, Portugal, Schweden, wozu noch zwei Staaten mit einer stark dominierenden alter Staatsnation – Spanien und Großbritannien – auch gehören. Andererseits sind mehrere Ethnien zu beobachten, aus denen sich – wie wir heute wissen – eigenständige Nationen und meistens sogar Nationalstaaten entwickelten. Dies war weder vorprogrammiert, noch historisch „notwendig“. Nicht jede unter diesen Ethnien wurde zu einer eigenständigen Nation. Erfolgreich waren mehrheitlich jene in Mittel- und Osteuropa – in den drei multiethnischen Imperien – aber auch im Westen

(Iren, Katalanen, Vlamen, Norweger, Basken). Der Weg zur Nation führte in diesen Fällen, wie schon gesagt, durch nationale Bewegung.

Ich möchte hier keine ausführliche Schilderung der nationalen Bewegungen geben. Es sei nur konstatiert, dass die meisten nationalen Bewegungen früher oder später ihre Ziele erreicht haben: Akzeptanz der nationalen Identität in Massen, eigenständige Schriftsprache und Kultur, volle soziale Struktur und ein gewisser Grad der Teilnahme (mal sehr groß, mal sehr gering) an der Selbstverwaltung. Aus Nationen-in-spe sind meistens schon im Laufe der 2. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts Nationen ohne Staat entstanden, für welche fast alle charakteristische Züge gelten, welche wir bei Montserrat Guibernau für die „Nations without State“ finden. Meistens haben ihre Programme die nationalstaatliche Unabhängigkeit nicht mal erwogen, sondern immer nur mit einer Autonomie gerechnet. Nur einige wenige nationale Bewegungen haben übrigens bis zum 1. Weltkrieg die Eigenstaatlichkeit erreicht, fast alle unter ihnen im Südosten Europas (die griechische, serbische, bulgarische, außer Balkan war es nur die norwegische).

Wenn ich die Gegenüberstellung der Staatsnation und der nationalen Bewegung an dieser Stelle thematisiere, dann handelt es sich um keine akademische Frage der Vergangenheit, sondern um ein bis zu unserer Zeit aktuelles Problem. Wenn man die spezifischen Stereotype und politischen Kulturen dieser „kleinen Nationen“ verstehen und interpretieren will, dann muss man diesen Unterschied berücksichtigen. Nur kurz einige Belege: für die Mitglieder kleiner Nationen ist ihre nationale Existenz nicht selbstverständlich, man will immer wieder den Anspruch auf Eigenständigkeit belegen. Es gab eine lange Zeit und in manchen Fällen gibt es noch heute einen Stereotyp der Bedrohung von außen. Dazu gesellt sich ein Kult des einfachen Volkes, die Sympathie zum egalitären Demokratismus, Hochschätzung der Bildung, aber auch Provinzialismus, und Misstrauen gegenüber alles Fremde. Eine objektive Charakteristik muss man noch ergänzen: diese ehemaligen Nationen ohne Staat hatten und haben keine Erfahrung als Kolonialmächte und nur einige der westeuropäischen (die Schotten, Waliser, Katalanen) haben sich an der kolonialen Expansion ihrer herrschenden Staatsnation beteiligt.

Abschließend zu den Reflexionen der Genese moderner Nationen möchte ich vor einer falschen Optik warnen, die ich als eine historische Falle bezeichne. Sehr oft wird die nationale Gegenwart durch die Optik der moralischen Kategorien des 19. Jahrhunderts gesehen und umgekehrt: die Vergangenheit der Nationen wird in gegenwärtigen Koordinaten interpretiert. Das hat als Resultat, dass allzu viele, vor allem angelsächsische Autoren die nationalen Bewegungen des 19. Jahrhunderts nach Kriterien der Gegenwart als „nationalistisch“ bzw. „ethnizistisch“ verurteilen und diese Verurteilung wird dann auch auf einige der gegenwärtigen Nationen, bzw. nationaler Bewegungen übertragen. Manchmal stimmte es, meistens aber nicht.

III. Was ist aus der Nation in Europa und in der Welt geblieben?

Durch diesen historischen Umweg komme ich jetzt zu der Ausgangsfrage meiner Überlegungen. Wie steht es mit der Nation in Europa und in der heutigen Welt? Wenn es sich bei der modernen Nation um eine Gemeinschaft handelt, die sich erst an gewisser Entwicklungsstufe, als ein Bestandteil der Moderne formierte, dann stellt es sich eine legitime Frage nach ihrer Rolle, oder sogar nach ihrer Existenzberechtigung in der Postmoderne. Erfüllt die Nation nicht mehr ihre soziale Rolle und befindet sich deswegen auf dem Wege zum Untergang? Diese Frage ist übrigens keine neue: schon vor 100 Jahren hat sie als eine Zukunftsprognose u.a. Rosa Luxemburg und weniger radikal Lenin formuliert. Ich kann mich noch gut an die authentischen Leninisten erinnern, die festzustellen versuchten, wann und wie dies geschehen kann oder soll. Das einzige konkrete daraus resultierende Projekt war das Konzept des „Sowjetvolkes“ – einer Supranation, der die einzelnen nationalen Identitäten untergeordnet werden sollten.

Dies entspräche einigen heutigen Träumereien der Euroenthusiasten, die einen Untergang der Nation, bzw. eine Eingliederung des „Nationalismus“ in die allumfassende europäische Identität prophezeien. Ich möchte diesen Prognosen keine Aufmerksamkeit widmen – schon aus dem Grunde, dass unsere tagtäglichen Erfahrungen dagegen sprechen. Ich möchte auch noch auf die Schwierigkeit hinweisen, die daraus resultiert, dass man den hier beschriebenen Unterschied zwischen dem spezifisch emotionell beladenen Terminus „Nation“ und der kalt rationalen sozio-politischen Realität des Nationalstaates vielleicht zu wenig berücksichtigt. Übrigens: wie stark ist das emotionelle Potential der europäischen Identität?

In der makrohistorischen gesamteuropäischen Perspektive fällt ein ganz relevanter Unterschied zum 19. Jahrhundert auf. Heute ist der Nationalstaat zur europäischen Norm oder Normalität geworden. Wir finden nur ganz wenige staatenlose Nationen – und das nur im Westen Europas.

Am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts dagegen war es umgekehrt: es gab einige wenige Staatsnationen aus vormoderner Zeit, aber die Nationalstaaten waren ein Sonderfall, und ihre Anzahl nahm während des 19. Jahrhunderts nur ganz langsam zu. Die Nationen formierten sich meistens ohne Staat und setzten sich als ein Teil der Normalität durch und bei weitem nicht alle unter ihren politischen Repräsentativen sehnten sich nach eigenem Staat. Diese Nationen haben also erst im Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts ihre Staatlichkeit erreicht. Dies ist jedoch nicht der einzige Unterschied, welcher im Wesen der Sozialgruppe „Nation“ seit dem 19. Jahrhundert registrierbar ist.

Wenn wir nämlich jene Gemeinschaft vergleichen, die in der Formierungszeit des 19. Jahrhunderts als soziale Grosgruppe entstanden ist, und den Namen „Nation“ erhielt, mit dem, welche soziale Realität mit diesem Terminus heute bezeichnet wird, dann finden wir so relevante Unterschiede, dass ein radikaler Skeptiker behaupten könnte, die alte „klassische“ Nation (als Gemeinschaft) nur in der Gestalt der überlebenden nationalen Institutionen und als eine immer wieder aktualisierbare Erinnerung existiert.

Diese These ist in solch radikaler Formulierung kaum haltbar, aber ich sehe doch einen rationellen Kern darin. Fragen wir, was aus den grundlegenden Bindungen und Werten, an denen die europäische Nation des 19. Jahrhunderts baute, übrig geblieben ist, dann bekommen wir kein eindeutiges Bild. Die Nation ist heute nicht mehr als ein „Wert an sich“ betrachtet, stattdessen wird die (nationalstaatlich organisierte) Zivilgesellschaft hervorgehoben. Es wäre nicht schwer, herauszufinden, ob die emotionelle Attraktivität der Zivilgesellschaft in unserer Zeit annähernd gleich stark ist, wie jene der nationalen Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert.

Das humanistische Imperativ, im Dienste der Nation soll man der Menschheit dienen, klingt dem heutigen neoliberalen Individualismus ziemlich fremd. Die nationalen Interessen werden meistens als ein politischer Slogan benutzt, aber es ist nur das Interesse des Einzelnen, was als belegbar und akzeptierbar gilt. Wenn schon von nationalen Interessen ernst spricht, dann meint man die staatliche Konkurrenzfähigkeit im Handel und Industrie. Der altmodische Fortschrittsoptimismus der national organisierten Gemeinschaft ist verpönt oder wenigstens in Frage gestellt. Von den nationalen Codes, die an der Gemeinsamkeit der historischen Traditionen beruhten, ist nur ganz wenig übrig geblieben: das Geschichtsbewusstsein ist mehr politisch als national orientiert und im Zusammenhang infolgedessen meistens auf Zeitgeschichte begrenzt. Die für die „klassische“ Zeit der Nationen typische Gemeinsamkeit der hohen Kultur und der Volkskultur, an der die kulturellen nationalen Codes beruhten, ist vorbei: es vergrößert sich die Distanz zwischen der Hochkultur einer schmalen Schicht der intellektuellen Elite und der durch Massen Media vermittelten (und stark globalisierten, d.h. amerikanisierten) Kultur. Im Zusammenhang damit verliert allmählich auch die nationale Sprache ihre Position in den höchsten Etagen der nationalen Werte und Symbole. Nur zum Teil werden diese Defizite durch eine neue Identität stiftende Kraft substituiert: durch den Sport.

Eine wichtige Abschwächung der nationalen Gefühle ist mit der Pluralisierung der Identitäten verbunden. Während es in den früheren Zeiten als eine Norm galt, dass die nationale Identität die allumfassende und verbindliche Form der Zugehörigkeiten ist, wissen wir heute – und nutzen es aus –, dass jeder Einzelne mehrere Identitäten besitzt und dass man sogar zwei oder mehrere nationale Identitäten besitzen kann. Dadurch ist die früher so scharfe Trennungslinie zwischen „WIR“ und „SIE“ verwischt.

Dazu sollte man auch den Unterschied im Charakter der horizontalen Mobilität wahrnehmen: es formieren sich Eliten, die zwar eine Staatsangehörigkeit haben, diese aber nicht beachten, da sie ihren Job und Gewinne an beliebigen Orten Europas und der Welt suchen und finden können, wobei sie nicht in ihrer Muttersprache, sondern in der lingua Franca – in der englischen Sprache – kommunizieren.

Die Tatsache, dass die nationale Existenz für die Bürger fast aller europäischen Nationalstaaten selbstverständlich geworden ist, schließt Relikte oder transformierte Manifestationen der nationalen Identität nicht aus. Unter den positiven Relikten verstehe ich vor allem jene in Krisen- oder Katastrophensituationen vorkommende Ausdrücke der gesellschaftlich relevanten nationalen Solidarität. Beispiel die deutsche Wiedervereinigung. Unter den negativen Relikten dann die immer stärker werdende

Demonstrationen der Xenophobie gegenüber den „Anderen“, den Immigranten – eigentlich eine Weiterentwicklung der kolonialen nationalistischen Überheblichkeit. Unter den transformierten Erscheinungen der weiter lebenden nationalen Identität sei dann vor allem an das massive Interesse an nationalen Erfolgen auf dem Gebiete des Sports hingewiesen.

Soweit über die Veränderungen der europäische Realität von 19. zum 21. Jahrhundert. Wenden wir uns jetzt der globalisierten Wirkung unserer Termini. Inzwischen nämlich breiteten sich diese Termini Nation und Nationalismus weltweit und führen da ihr eigenes Leben. Neue Staaten, die aus den ehemaligen Kolonien entstanden, haben sich „Nations“ genannt. Bald danach – oder sogar zur gleichen Zeit – kam der Anspruch einer steigenden Anzahl der Stämme, auch als „Nations“ anerkannt zu werden. Die sich modernisierenden asiatischen Staaten haben sich teilweise schon früher, während ihrer Wende zum Kapitalismus auch zu Nationen erklärt. Das alles haben die Politologen und Soziologen ohne zu zögern durch den allumfassenden Begriff NATIONALISMUS abgestempelt, meistens ohne zu überlegen, dass sie Sein und Schein verwechseln.

Anders gesagt: die gedankenlose Anwendung des Terminus Nationalismus öffnete in der Forschung – und vielleicht auch in der Politik – Tür und Tor einer Serie von Missverständnissen und Missdeutungen, deren gemeinsamer Nenner die Verwechslung von völlig unterschiedlichen sozialen Formationen wurde, die unter gleichem Namen leben. Der autochthon europäische Terminus Nation wurde (mit Nationalismus) als selbstverständliche Realität in den nichteuropäischen Ländern importiert, meistens mit positiver Konnotation des „Nationalismus“ – denn es handelte sich ja um den Kampf gegen Ausbeutung von außen und um die Abschaffung der inneren Unterdrückung. Natürlich kann man solche Prozesse (und Excesse) des Kulturtransfers nicht verbieten, aber man sollte der Tatsache entsprechende Aufmerksamkeit widmen, dass nämlich sich die historischen Bedingungen und sozio-kulturelle Wurzeln dieses „Nationalismus“ wesentlich von den europäischen unterscheiden.

Diese Verwechslungen möchte ich abschließend als eine „globalistische Falle“ bezeichnen. Worin besteht sie? Allgemein wird angenommen, dass die meisten erfolgreichen Vertreter der neuen „nations“ in Afrika und Asien (teilweise auch in Lateinamerika) die nationalen Losungen nicht so sehr für kulturelle Integration ihrer Staatsgemeinschaften benutzen, wie vielmehr zur Stärkung ihrer Machtposition und eventuell auch ihres Vermögens. Wenn man ihre Tätigkeiten mit dem Terminus Nationalismus bezeichnet, dann hat man scheinbar keine Schwierigkeiten, dieses Modell in die gleiche Kategorie mit dem europäischen „Nationalismus“ einzuordnen und es sogar in die Vergangenheit zu projizieren, denn auch früher gab es doch auch überall den „Nationalismus“. In einer groben Generalisierung konnten demzufolge einige anerkannte Theoretiker behaupten, dass die Nationen – egal wann und wo sie entstanden – bloße Konstruktionen, oder sogar Erfindungen der Intellektuellen oder Politiker sind. Diese Theorien stehen allerdings im schroffen Kontrast zu unseren

empirischen Kenntnissen aus der Geschichte der europäischen nationalen Formierungsprozesse.

Dieser Syllogismus – und damit komme ich zu meiner Ausgangsposition – exemplifiziert die schon erwähnte Gefahr der Trennung von Begrifflichkeit und Realität. Durch diese Trennung bezeichnet ein und dasselbe Wort unter unterschiedlichen soziokulturellen Bedingungen auch ganz unterschiedliche Segmente der Gesellschaft, bzw. Typen der politisch organisierten Gemeinschaften. Was in Europa am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts Nation hieß, existiert in Europa eher als Kulisse und Erinnerung, während das, was heute außerhalb Europas als „nation“ bezeichnet wird, ist wiederum eine völlig unterschiedliche soziale und kulturelle Gemeinschaft, als es in Europa war (und in Relikten noch ist). Bei alledem zirkuliert das Wort „nationalism“ als eine Vignette, die man an beliebige Objekte draufkleben kann. Nichtsdestoweniger: Diese Spannungen zwischen der aus Europa importierten Begrifflichkeit und afrikanischer, bzw. asiatischer sozialen Realität gehört zugleich zu faszinierenden Forschungsaufgaben für die Zukunft.

Unsere abschließenden Betrachtungen sollten sich jedoch nicht auf die Ebene der Begrifflichkeit begrenzen. Abgesehen von dem spezifischen Eigenleben der außereuropäischen „nations“, erlebt die Realität Nation in ihrer europäischen Heimat einen signifikanten Wandel. Die nationale Existenz eine staatliche geworden und infolge dessen ist das Nationale zum Gegenstand der politischen Machtkämpfe geworden und wird im Rahmen dieses Kampfes manipuliert und kontrolliert. Kurz gesagt, oft haben wir den Eindruck, dass die nationale Gemeinschaft, für die man bereit war, Opfer zu bringen und die als Centrum securitatis galt, allmählich aufhört, ihre Funktion zu erfüllen. Sie ist weder abgestorben noch verschwunden, sondern hat das humanistische Erbe verloren und befindet sich daher in einer Sackgasse. Sie überlebt als reale soziale Großgruppe nur in immer kleineren Relikten, aber wird immer weiter und vielleicht sogar stärker in der Ebene der Worte, der Rhetorik fortgepflanzt, was den Weg zur Demagogie und Missbrauch durch Medien öffnet. Es tut mir leid, ich kann mir keinen positiven Ausweg aus dieser Situation vorstellen.

The birth of a united Europe: On why the EU has generated a 'non emotional' identity

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Abstract

In several respects the EU represents both a novel system of quasi-supranational governance and a novel form of political community or polity. But it is also a relatively fragile construction for it remains a community still in the making with an incipient sense of identity and within which powerful forces are at work. This paper has three main aims. First, to analyze the reasons and key ideas that prompted a selected elite to construct a set of institutions and treaties destined to unite European nations in such a way that the mere idea of a 'civil war' among them would become impossible. Second, to examine the specific top-down processes that led to the emergence of a united Europe and the subsequent emergence of the European Union thus emphasizing the constant distance between the elites and the masses in the development of the European project. Finally to explain why the EU has generated what I call a 'non-emotional' identity radically different from the emotionally charged and still prevailing national identities present in its member states.

Introduction

The geographical boundaries of Europe have experienced dramatic changes throughout time; even the most recent past offers different examples, which illustrate the shifting character of European borders. The post-1989 unification of Germany, the separation of Czechoslovakia, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the independence achieved by the Baltic Republics and the dismembering of the Soviet Union illustrate significant border alterations within European countries taking place in the last fifteen years. Further to this, we should consider the claims of countries such as Turkey, which are currently asserting their European character and demand the right to be included within the EU. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU have strengthened the idea that the boundaries of Europe are not fixed and that the boundaries of the EU, which is often identified with 'Europe', are not fixed either. It follows from this that the definition of Europe and indeed who is included and who is excluded from Europe tends to change throughout time.

Many scholars and politicians have turned to defend the idea that what unites Europeans is the sharing of a certain culture and values which differentiate them from other peoples, more crucially from Eastern peoples. This argument is based upon the assumption that 'there has always been a different way of life between East and West, between the full and half European ... between real Europeans, and those caught in a

nether world between the European and Asian' (Burgess 1997: 67). There are also some intellectuals that consider Europe as a system of values and mention the impact of Christianity and the rise of a set of ideas including those of freedom, humanism and material progress as key elements in the construction of an incipient European identity. At present there is a substantial body of literature which examines the historical origins of contemporary Europe and argues that some common 'traditions' and a somewhat unspecified sense of common 'consciousness' have united the peoples of Europe since the Middle Ages (Llobera 1994). Such accounts highlight European unity above the diversity, which has traditionally defined European peoples. The contemporary search for a common past and traditions responds to the need to identify or invent some elements capable of acting as pillar blocs in the construction of a shared sense of European identity that, ideally, should go hand in hand with greater EU integration. However, and in spite of considerable efforts to define such elements, it is proving quite difficult to agree on them particularly since the history of European peoples is fraught with memories of war. In addition, the status of Europe as a cultural unit and a system of values remains problematic. There is a sharp contrast between Europe's strengthening institutional structures and more intensive processes of governance, on the one hand (at least so far as the EU is concerned), and the relative weakness and uncertainty of the values that underpin it on the other (Moravcsik 1998; Nugent 2003; Rosamond 2000).

The birth of a united Europe

'Tout ne s'est pas perdu, mais tous s'est senti perir...Nous autres civilisations, nous savons maintenant que nous sommes mortelles' Paul Valéry, Variété I, *La Crise de l'esprit*. Paris, 1924

It was after the devastation caused by World War I that Paul Valéry was able to acknowledge the 'mortal' character of Europe and Europeans identifying the death of Europe's civilization as a real possibility. However, it was only after two world wars, that the movement for a united Europe was initiated.

As early as 1944 a group of resistance militants belonging to nine European countries met near Geneva and issued a joint declaration emphasizing the solidarity uniting the peoples fighting Nazism. They set up the moral, social, economic and political principles for a union of their countries, while proclaiming the need to surrender full national sovereignty in favour of a single federal union (Keyserlingk 1972:51). In their view, world peace was dependent on Europe's peace. They argued that, within a single generation, Europe had been the epicentre of two world conflicts caused by the existence of thirty sovereign states within the continent. In their view, nationalism was to be blamed for the desire of nations to expand their boundaries, dominate other peoples, access and control resources beyond their borders, and ultimately foster chauvinism and the hatred of the different.

The tide against nationalism and in favour of building a united federal Europe expanded throughout the continent and small groups, associations, movements and federalist leagues became common place. Their leaders met in Montreux in 1947 and again in The

Hague in 1948 where the *Congress of Europe* took place. This was an exclusively elitist movement lead by intellectuals and political leaders. Their aim was to draw a plan destined to unify Europe by turning it into a federation. Above all, their mission was to promote peace and prosperity. At the same time, they also sought to foster an agreement on some shared principles and values aimed at the construction of some kind of spiritual community based upon the cosmopolitan Catholic ideal of social justice (Reynold de Gonzague 1940).

They called for the institution of a Council of Europe, a European Human Rights Court and a European Assembly. They also demanded the construction of some common institutions dealing with industrial production, social welfare, border taxes and free exchange of goods. The impact of such an ambitious initiative, against the spread of nationalism and in favour of finding a way of interlocking European nations politically and economically, was to give rise, ten years later, to the construction of the European Coal and Steel Community. New institutions such as Euratom and the Common Market were to follow suit. In turn, they also supported the creation of the European Centre of Culture –build in Geneva in 1949 and encouraged the construction of a network of institutes, associations and foundations devoted to the promotion and dissemination of Europe’s culture. Their aim was to replace the late eighteenth century nationalist fervour associated with the idea of the nation, based on popular sovereignty, and the emotional passionate feelings aroused by Romantic nationalism in the mid nineteenth century- by strong anti-nationalism.

Ultimately, the leaders of the proEuropean federalist movement sought to highlight the key role played by nationalism in the inception of Nazism and Fascism and the subsequent destruction of Europe during the war. They stood in favour of a brand of federalism defined by ‘unity in diversity’ while simultaneously defending the equilibrium between local freedoms and common duties, the sharing of common rights and the limitation of national sovereignty.

The architects of a united Europe

Jean Monet and Robert Schuman in France, Konrad Adenauer in West Germany, Alcide de Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli in Italy and Paul-Henri Spaak in Belgium are to be credited as the founding fathers of the EU. They had experienced the War and some of them had suffered persecution and imprisonment. Schuman, Adenauer and Gasperi were Christian Democrats, Spinelli –initially a communist was a committed federalist- and Spaak was a socialist. Jean Monet was a staunch internationalist. They shared a profound awareness of the need for reconciliation –Germany should not remain isolated after the War- but even more importantly, they were convinced that lasting peace could only be achieved through a united Europe, which they generally imagined as a United States of Europe adopting some kind of federalist structure (Bond, Smith and Wallace 1996; Burgess 2000).

Adenauer, De Gasperi and Schuman envisaged a united Europe that would save the Free World from collapse and from communism alike. To this aim, the integration of nations into a federal system was imperative at the price of sacrificing full national sovereignty.

Initially they created the Council of Europe and the European Parliament as platforms for the meeting of nations no longer divided between the vanquished and the victors (Pinder 1998). As early as 1941 Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi wrote the Ventotene Manifesto entitled 'Towards a Free and United Europe' while they were imprisoned by the fascist. They advanced a clear proposal for the creation of a European federation of states and, after the War, Spinelli became the leader of the European Federalist Movement (MFE).

De Gasperi, leader and founder of the Christian Democrat party of Italy, constantly emphasized the need to consolidate structures binding together European nations. His idea of Europe included the integration and eventual understanding with the East, an objective also shared by Adenauer, who used to define himself as 'European' at a time when this was not fashionable.

In 1949 De Gasperi addressed the first European Parliament in the Palace of Europe in Strasbourg. He underlined the need for a joint ideal of unity as a substitute for the dangerous spirit of nationalism if a further 'civil war' among Europeans was to be avoided. Europe should fight against disintegration, decline and reciprocal distrust. The 'rational' –unity of Europe, fraternity and solidarity- should stand against the 'irrational' –nationalism and greater national expansion (Preda 2004: 554ff).

In 1950 Robert Schuman, primer minister of France and later Foreign Affairs Minister of France, announced a proposal to merge the coal and steel industries of France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy under a higher European authority (Diebold 1959). Initially this was regarded as a dream, later he faced sharp opposition in France and was accused of disloyalty. De Gaulle was particularly critical of the move to unite Europe (Schuman 1963).

Adenauer and De Gasperi were pressing for concrete action to take place but their countries had been defeated in the war and they could not adopt a leading role, that was reserved to France and Schuman fully realized it. As early as 1943 Jean Monet had addressed the National Liberation Committee (the free French government in Algiers). He said:

There will be no peace in Europe if the States rebuild themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with its implications on prestige politics and economic protection.... The countries of Europe are not strong enough individually to be able to guarantee prosperity and social development for their peoples. The States of Europe must therefore form a federation or a European entity that would make them into a common economic unit (Monet 1978:21)

Monet was instrumental in preparing the 1950 Schuman Declaration (Schuman Plan) that prompted the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) initially integrated by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands; an institution that paved the way to the subsequent development of the EU. The Schuman Plan represented the first international agreement allowing Germany to be treated as an equal partner among European nations and that was a cardinal point

towards European unity. Further to this, the Schuman Plan sought to include Russia and the East. In Schuman's own words, in a speech before the French Assembly (6th December, 1951): 'we must not construct a Europe sadly mutilated. We must not construct Europe only in the interests of people who are free, but must also be able to welcome the people of the East, who once, free from subjugation of which they have been victims, will ask to join us' (quoted in Keyserlingk 1972:151)

In France, the Schuman Plan generated fierce opposition from the extreme right and from the extreme left. In West Germany, opposition to Adenauer's endorsement of the Schuman Plan came primarily from the Socialists who accused him of jeopardizing Germany's national independence. Conversely Konrad Adenauer maintained his position and actively sought reconciliation with France with the aim of binding Germany to the Western alliance. He was convinced that the union of economic interests among European nations should give rise to a political union. In his 'Address to the Council of Europe' in 1951, Adenauer referred to the 'collective will of the European peoples' as expressed by the Council. He also defended federation as an 'intermediate solution' which 'will meet the need for unity and at the same time preserve the traditional variety of conditions, customs, and legitimate special interests of the individual States' (Adenauer 1951: 1005-1010).

In 1952 the European Defense Plan envisaged the incorporation of German divisions into a European force under European Command but France was extremely reticent to accept this measure. In spite of Churchill and Eisenhower's view that France should, at all costs, avoid a situation that would jeopardize the European Defence Community (EDC) while inevitably leading to the formation of national armies –including a German national army- France was not convinced.

The high relevance of the EDC was evident if a united Europe –including Germany- was to be constructed. It is important to bear in mind that at the time when these discussions were taking place, the so-called Occupation Statute of Germany was still in place and that precisely one of the most critical points included in the EDC was the signature of a German Treaty establishing a West-German sovereign state. By early 1954 France had not even submitted the EDC to the French National Assembly and the Allied Occupation Statute of Germany was still in force. This situation was weakening Adenauer's credibility in Germany where the Socialist labelled him as 'the Chancellor of the Allies'. Adenauer was strongly in favour of a united European army as the best guarantee for a united Europe and received a huge blow when in August 1954 the French Assembly voted against the EDC. In his view, 'Nationalism had been displaced by the European idea...but if the European idea was to be wrecked by France's action strong nationalism could return to Germany, not fascism or Nazism but a new nationalism looking to the Soviet Union if Germany was rebuffed by the West' (Keyserlingk 1972: 159).

De Gasperi understood Adenauer's argument very well and he was extremely concerned about the consequences of marginalizing Germany. For this reason, he decided to use his influence to reach a solution. This was eventually found by British Prime Minister

Anthony Eden who proposed that West Germany become a member of NATO. He also suggested the removal of any references to the EDC in the Bonn-Paris conventions. Before the end of the year, the Western European Union was constituted and the Allied Occupation Statute was abolished by the Treaties of Paris (1954) that came into effect on May 5, 1955 (Adenauer 1967: 259). On that date, Adenauer became Chancellor of the Sovereign Federal Republic of Germany. In his address, he already envisaged the dream of a reunited Germany: 'there is for us only one place in the world side by side with the free nations. Our goal is: a free and united Germany in a free and united Europe' (Keyserlingk 1972: 160).

As we have shown, in its inception European unity was built by an elite formed by some key political leaders and supported by some intellectuals across Europe; among them Denis de Rougemont, Salvador de Madariaga, Ortega y Gasset and Gonzague de Reynold. They were convinced that the construction of a set of institutions closely connecting national economic, defense, political and cultural interests was the best antidote to the re-emergence of nationalism. Spaak, who became the first president of the European Parliament in 1949, insisted that nations should be willing to sacrifice their own self-interest in order for all people to flourish. He argued that the new Europe should have a common sense of purpose based on its shared political, social and legal values.

As already mentioned, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was first proposed by Robert Schuman in 1950 as a strategy to prevent further war between France and Germany. Europe's first supranational community, was formally established by the Treaty of Paris (1951) and signed by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and ruled by a European 'High Authority' constituted by representatives of its various nations. The so-called Spaak Report led to the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), together with the previously constituted ECSC they became the first international organization to be based on supranationalism. The Treaty of Rome culminated the process envisaged in the Schuman Plan and set up solid pillars for the emergence of the European Union.

The actions of Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer sought not only to build a series of institutions destined to avoid war, they were Christian Democrats and as such they also wished to construct a moral society based upon the Catholic ideal of social justice. According to Keyserlingk 'they fought for a Christian society whereas Paul Henri Spaak, a great statesman who had contributed much in support of these three men, only saw, as an avowed agnostic, the standard of living as an end in itself' (Keyserlingk 1972: 162).

A widening gap between elites and the people

European unity emerged out of the deeds and actions of a small elite of politicians and intellectuals united by the experience of World War II. They were determined to avoid Europe's decline by interlocking its nations into a set of supranational institutions and

agreements destined to force interdependence and make war among them impossible. The devastation they had witnessed convinced these elites of the need to make sacrifices and accept compromises at national level in order to strengthen the weakened position of their own nation-states. The distance between these elites and the masses was enormous, however, the subsequent development of the EU since the 1980s has managed to consolidate the EU as a global political actor and its prosperity has acted as a magnet to peoples willing to enter the Union.

So far, Europe's founding fathers have been successful in avoiding internal war by building a primarily 'institutionally connected' Europe lacking a significant shared sense of identity, but the building of such an identity was never their aim.

The EU: a 'non-emotional' identity

European identity cannot be founded upon the cultural and linguistic homogenization of its citizens, a mistake too often made by nation-states seeking to annihilate internal diversity to create a homogeneous citizenry. National and ethnic minorities claiming the right to cultural and linguistic survival and, in some cases the right to self-determination are now contesting such homogenization attempts. In a similar manner, European identity cannot claim to rely upon a common past and it cannot even boast about clear-cut geographical or cultural boundaries.

In contrast, a still embryonic European identity relays on the shared consciousness of belonging to an economic and political space defined by capitalism, social welfare, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, freedom and the rule of law, prosperity and progress. In my view, these are the pillars of a European identity primarily defined by the sharing of a specific political culture and the desire to benefit from the economic advantages derived from EU membership. But, are these sufficient to generate loyalty to the EU? Would support for the EU dwindle if an economic crisis were to hit it hard?

As I see it, a major economic crisis would undoubtedly question the purpose of the EU at a time when the economic prosperity associated with the Union has become of paramount importance to member states- new and old- as well as for those currently applying for membership. Although it is also true that avoiding Russian influence by firmly placing themselves within Western political and military structures -such as the EU and NATO- is regarded as a guarantee of independence by former Soviet republics now turned into independent nation-states. The EU is still a fragile institution and to make it work, nation-states need to believe that they would not get a finer deal by abandoning the Union. Up to now economic prosperity is driving EU political integration and a major failure in this area would undermine the EU's capacity to bring about political integration to a standstill situation. At the moment, the economic incentives of EU membership are enormous however, member states' determination to protect their own national interests is so robust that, if a major economic crisis were to affect the EU, this could prompt some member-states to believe that they could do better on their own or by establishing alternative partnerships. Under those circumstances, a still feeble and incipient European identity would suffer a major blow.

I argue that, at least while in its early stages, European identity is best defined as an emergent ‘non-emotional’ identity, in contrast with the powerful and emotionally charged national identities of our time. The federalist ideals of Europe’s architects have not dispelled nationalism and even today national identity remains very strong when compared with Europe’s ‘non-emotional identity’. In its present form, I do not expect European identity to arouse feelings comparable to those inspired by national identity. In a similar manner, I do not anticipate the emergence of a European nationalism powerful enough to mobilize the masses in the name of Europe; it would be problematical to find common causes and interests, symbols and rituals uniting Europeans and prompting them to sacrifice their own lives in the name of the EU. So far, the nation retains the emotional attachment of its citizens and when it becomes alien to them or too wide and distant, individuals turn to regional, ethnic, local and other forms of identity tying them to more sizeable communities than the EU.

At this point we may wonder whether European identity is weak and ‘non-emotional’ because only a small number of intellectuals and political elites were involved in creating it or whether its weakness responds to the founding fathers’ neglect of this fundamental aspect. In my view, the EU founding fathers did not confer sufficient weight to the need to construct a European identity able to replace national identities and nationalism because, ultimately, they sought to preserve their own nations and the identities associated with them within the larger framework provided by the EU.

As Milward has pointed out, the evolution of the EU since 1945 has been an integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an organizational concept. It was to protect the nation-state’s weakness that the EU was built. This approach implies a tension between, on the one hand, the determination to eliminate obnoxious nationalism through the commitment to federalism and, on the other, the will to protect and strengthen Europe’s nation-states after two devastating world wars. Without the EU, ‘the nation-state could not have offered to its citizens the same measure of security and prosperity which it has provided and which has justified its survival’ (Milward 2000: 3).

The EU’s founding fathers were leading politicians in their own countries and, as such, they were committed to a European federalism dependent from the intergovernmentalist approach deriving from their own national allegiances. In their quest to build an institutionally interconnected Europe, they focused on economic, cultural and political aspects. In so doing, they completely ignored the need for intellectuals to mobilize the people in favour of a united Europe and, as a result, they failed to damp down the fires of nationalism.

Conclusion

The loyalty, sense of belonging, readiness to sacrifice and love associated with the nation and promoted by nationalism remain very strong in contemporary Europe. They are also present within the EU and, often, come to the fore when national aims are placed above European aims, when national sovereignty and national interests are paramount.

It could be argued that while focussed on the eradication of nationalism and the emotions associated with it, the EU founding fathers overlooked that irrationality and emotions are a constituent part of human nature. Their failure to build a 'European identity', engaging both intellectuals and the people alike, meant that the European project was to remain exposed to an eventual re-ignition of the dormant ashes of nationalism. But, perhaps the founding fathers, guided by outstanding evidence showing that nationalism could be only watered down but never eradicated, consciously decided to invest 'only' in the interlocking of European interests as a mechanism to preserve peace. Conceivably, it was not due to neglect or lack of vision that they did not take steps toward the construction of a European identity capable of replacing national identities, rather they might have considered that as an impossible task.

To them, the strength of nationalism was a force too formidable to be reckoning with; a force that could only be weakened and contained temporarily but never eliminated. Up to the present and over more than sixty years, the founding fathers have fulfilled their aim of maintaining peace and fostering prosperity within Europe. This is a great achievement in itself however, the flames of nationalism have not been extinguished and at the dawn of the twenty first century, national identity remains much more powerful than the still incipient 'non emotional' European identity.

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Les rates que menjaven cultura

Francesc Serés

Disculpin la nota biogràfica però em sembla que està justificada. Vaig néixer en un poble petit on, llevat de mestres, metges i policia, tothom parlava en català. La vida *oficial*, emperò, era en castellà i, per descomptat, també l'ensenyament i els llibres de la biblioteca. És per això que vaig descobrir la literatura catalana als divuit anys, quan la literatura castellana de Delibes, Cela o Sánchez Ferlosio ja havia ocupat el meu imaginari i em descrivia el meu paisatge com si fos la Meseta. No és estrany, s'hi assembla bastant.

De mica en mica, els referents descriptius i vivencials que tenia de la meva zona es van anant modificant, complementant i substituint per d'altres que trobava en la literatura de Moncada, Rodoreda, Pla o Sagarra. De la mateixa manera que ara no puc entendre Catalunya sense la literatura d'arreu i de tots els temps, tampoc no puc entendre el món sense la literatura catalana. La complexitat del món no convoca solament la totalitat dels fets, sinó que és també el resultat del sumatori dels discursos i dels relats que hi friccionen i per entendre'l, cal la totalitat d'àmbits interpretatius i expressius. També he après que cal saber llegir el món per entendre alguns llibres. Vaig llegir per primera vegada *Viatges i flors* de Rodoreda fa gairebé vint anys i he de reconèixer que no vaig entendre res.

Per comprendre el món i la literatura, emperò, també cal saber que es mouen en la direcció dels vectors que els diferents poders dibuixen. Pascale Casanova i d'altres n'han parlat a bastament. Obviar que els sistemes culturals també són agents actius i passius de si mateixos i dels altres sistemes seria d'una candidesa inacceptable. Disculpin una segona nota biogràfica: al poble on vaig néixer es viu del conreu de fruita dolça i amb pomes els exemples solen ser més senzills: hi ha més de 7.000 varietats de poma en tot el món, però el 99% del comerç mundial l'acaparen 20 varietats.

Passa amb les pomes, amb les literatures i, per descomptat, amb els sistemes culturals. Els dos darrers segles, l'antropologia ha tingut un camp de treball inabastable, la feina se li acumulava fins i tot abans d'existir com a disciplina. L'anihilació, l'arraconament o la subordinació de sistemes culturals produiria, per osmosi, una reproducció de formes culturals variades dins de les cultures dominants. Avui sabem que tot això no és del tot veritat. De fet, havia de ser molt clar, si ho sabia fa vint anys un postadolescent que no entenia *Viatges i flors*...

L'any 1986 Fredric Jameson va publicar un article que ha estat criticat i citat com pocs. *A Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism*, Jameson venia a dir – tot resum tendeix a la inexactitud – que les literatures del tercer món produeixen al·legories nacionals. Aijad Ahmad i d'altres han criticat aquest article amb lucidesa, amb arguments sòlids i amb exemples concloents. La lletra, no ho podem negar, presentava defectes. Però, ¿i la música? És cert, no podem agrupar *literatures* sota un

epígraf tan genèric com el de literatures del tercer món i, endemés, la vaguetat del concepte al·legoria nacional fa que sigui molt difícil d'aplicar de manera generalitzada. No obstant això, si flexibilitzem la tesi principal de l'article de Jameson, ¿podríem dir que les literatures de països que mostren fractures econòmiques, socials i polítiques que els subordinen respecte d'altres intenten narrar-se, intenten explicar-se a si mateixos, fer metàfora de la seva situació? ¿De què han de parlar els escriptors bolivians, birmans, congolesos o sud-africans? ¿Quins han de ser els referents? Fins i tot en el cas d'autors com Coetzee, Roth o Müller, ¿no són al·legories de la resistència? ¿I Rodoreda?

Un escriptor té la llibertat de triar els seus arguments, sens dubte, no pretenc establir cap mena de temàtica obligatòria, però algú haurà de narrar a la resta del món el que succeeix a Birmània, al Congo o a Bolívia. ¿Algú consideraria versemblant els relats de la literatura algeriana no tinguessin en compte el procés de descolonització o les no tan llunyanes matances del GIA? De la mateixa manera i amb la reducció gradual que calgui, ¿podem entendre que quan diem que hi ha comunitats lingüístiques que competeixen amb d'altres, estem parlant en termes de contrast i de comparació, de poder i de discurs?

Vegem-ho a través del llibre de què parlem. L'any 1980 Mercè Rodoreda va publicar un llibre excepcional, *Viatges i flors*. La part *Viatges* narra l'itinerari que emprèn un viatger, un viatger que travessa tots tot de pobles amb un objectiu clar. Se'ns informa, gens casualment, al final del relat del viatge al poble de vidre, els habitants del qual són els més savis i civilitzats, els més purs. “¿Per què, si va enamorar-se'n, no s'hi va establir?» «Perquè la meua feina no és aturar-me sinó anar sempre endavant; continuar la infinita busca i captura de cors obscurs i costums ignorats.»” L'etapa del viatge que ens interessa, aquí, és la que se situa al poble de les rates ben criades. El poble és un poble com tants d'altres, diu el narrador, amb flors als balcons, però amb una peculiaritat, viu sotmès per unes rates molt particulars. Les rates estan organitzades, parlen entre si i, més important encara, roseguen les cases de fusta dels vilatans. Quan els homes han intentat construir cases de pedra les rates se'ls han menjat.

La situació a què al·ludeix Mercè Rodoreda en el conte és molt més complexa que no sembla. Pel que diu i pel que significa. Els homes del poble viuen una vida sense sentit, la seva feina consisteix en sobreviure per poder alimentar les rates. Tenen por de que la seva decisió de deixar de fer-ho faci que siguin ells mateixos, els que converteixin en menjar dels rosegadors. Els habitants del poble pateixen la humiliació continuada d'anar vestits amb els parracs que les rates, de tant en tant, els roseguen. Les orelles, també les tenen ratades. La vida consisteix en un anar passant amb pena i sense glòria sota l'amenaça d'enderroc de qualsevol tipus de construcció. El paral·lelisme amb la situació de Catalunya sota el jou del franquisme és evident, l'al·legoria nacional és tan completa que no podem obviar la comparació de l'exili de l'escriptora amb la figura del viatger que fuig cames ajudeu-me...

No cal posar en dubte la llibertat individual, democràtica, moderna i il·lustrada, de l'escriptor. Determinisme creatiu és un oxímoron impracticable. La mirada de Rushdie sobre l'Índia es complementa amb la de Naipaul i amb la de milers d'escriptors que flexionen el discurs amb paraules que intenten abastar la totalitat del món. La qüestió

radica en com conjugar la capacitat de creació irrenunciablement individual i intransferible amb el signe dels temps, amb quelcom semblant a la *Weltanschauung*. És clar, *Weltanschauung* és una paraula tan connotada que, quan intentem que assumeixi també el concepte d'al·legoria nacional comencem a pensar si estem seguint un camí o si som davant d'un atzucac.

Els relats poden crear mecanismes de resistència cultural. És evident que la literatura, per si mateixa, no pot salvar la societat a la que pertany de totes i cadascuna de les catàstrofes que la poden afectar, però seria frívol negar que es poden construir relats que qüestionin l'estat de les coses o, com a mínim, que en deixin testimoni. Una cultura petita, ha de ser, per força permeable, capaç d'hibridar-se, de mutar, és obvi. Ha de ser també capaç de projectar les raons de la seva existència, la seva història, les seves condicions de possibilitat. La dignitat d'una cultura, la seva raó d'ésser, no la defineix la seva grandària (*sic*) sinó, entre d'altres coses, la capacitat que té d'aportar a les diverses tradicions culturals i el diàleg que pot mantenir amb altres cultures. Rodoreda n'és l'exemple.

Els vilatans del poble de les rates ben criades no en saben res, de les discussions postmodernes, ni de teories literàries. Narrar, narrar-se, és el primer pas que donen les comunitats per tal de pensar qui són, d'on vénen i cap a on van. La descripció i la reelaboració dels fets i dels discursos que expliquen i que poden transformar aquests fets, el passat, el present i el futur. El poble on vaig néixer, quan era petit, s'assemblava força i força al que descriu Rodoreda llevat que no hi havia rates que se'ns mengessin la cultura. O potser sí, que n'hi havia.

“Els fronts dèbils del pluralisme polític. Europa i les minories nacionals i culturals”

Ferran Requejo

Every political tradition creates its own legitimising language, its own concepts, its own objectives and its own values. The history of political liberalism – from its beginnings in the 17th century to now – can be presented as a history of the increasing recognition and institutionalisation of a number of specific demands for impartiality by different (social, economic, cultural, national, etc) sectors of modern and contemporary societies. It is often pointed out that the abstract and supposedly universalist language that underlies the presentation of the values of liberty, equality and pluralism of political liberalism has, in practice, contrasted with the exclusion of many ‘voices’ with regard to the institutional regulation of the specific liberties, equalities and pluralisms of contemporary states. This was the case – and in some contexts continues to be so – of those who do not own property; of women; of indigenous peoples; of racial, national, ethnic and linguistic minorities, etc. Despite everything that political liberalism represented as an emancipative political movement in comparison with the traditional institutions of the *Ancien Régime* (rights charters, principle of representation, principle of legality, competitive elections, constitutionalism and procedures of the rule of law, separation of powers, parliamentarianism, etc), we know that most liberals of the 18th and 19th centuries were opposed to the regulation of rights of democratic participation such as universal suffrage or the right of association. These rights, whose presence in modern-day democracies is now totally taken for granted, had to be wrested from early liberalism and constitutionalism after decades of social conflict, above all with the political organisations of the working classes. Later, following the constitutionally recognised ‘liberal and democratic waves of democracy’ of the second half of the 20th century, social notions of equality and equity would be transformed, especially after the constitutional inclusion of a ‘third wave’ of social rights, which formed the base of the welfare states created at the end of the Second World War.

Nowadays, we could say that liberal democracies and international society are faced with a new emancipative element, but this time the legal contrasts are not of a social but of a cultural and national nature. In recent years, the idea has slowly been growing that, if we wish to proceed towards liberal democracies of greater moral and institutional quality, the values of liberty, equality and political pluralism must also be taken into account from the perspective of national and cultural differences. Today we know that the rights of the first three waves – liberal, democratic and social – do not by themselves guarantee the implementation of these values in the cultural and national sphere. In other words, the idea has gradually been gaining ground that state uniformism – implicit

in the traditional liberal-democratic (and social) conceptions of equality of citizenship or popular sovereignty – is an enemy of liberty, equality and pluralism in the cultural and national spheres. Moreover, the idea that it is advisable to foster more morally refined and institutionally complex versions of liberal democracies in order to accommodate their diverse types of internal pluralism has also received increased support.

Thus, a value such as equality is no longer exclusively contrasted, in conceptual terms, with political and social *inequality*, but also with cultural and national *difference*. This is linked with a whole collective dimension that cannot be reduced to the individualist, universalist and stateist approach of traditional democratic liberalism and constitutionalism. This latter approach still predominates in the values and legitimising discourse of a great many of the political actors of contemporary democracies (governments, parliaments, parties, etc) – both in the sphere of the classic right and the left – as well as in the majority of the variations of liberal and republican theories of democracy. The repercussions of the *cultural and national turn* of the foundations of democratic legitimacy are not limited to the sphere of Western democracies, but also influence the normativity that should rule in an international society. The most significant empirical cases are those related to minority nations, to national minorities, to indigenous peoples and to transnational immigrations.ⁱ All these cases pose specific

questions regarding recognition and political accommodation in contemporary democracies (group rights, self-government, the defence of particular cultural values, presence in the international sphere, etc). It could be said that we are currently facing a new aspect of political equity which is fundamental in order to progress towards democracies of greater ‘ethical’ quality, but for which the traditional theories of democracy, liberalism and constitutionalism lack a suitable response. In other words, the idea is gaining ground that uniformism and limited traditional liberal individualism are the enemies of key dimensions of equality, liberty and pluralism. Thus, the quest for suitable forms of cosmopolitanism and universalism involves establishing a broad recognition and political accommodation, in terms of equity, of the national and cultural voices that are excluded, marginalised or downgraded in liberal democracies.

In recent years there has been much debate about the cultural ‘limits’ of a liberal and democratic society. This debate is making it easier to understand liberal and democratic traditions themselves – their limits and possibilities – in terms of theory and institutional practice. It is also facilitating a better understanding and practical expression of the values of these traditions – the regulation of different types of pluralism in civic and political liberties and in different types of equalities. There are many possible forms of democracy and it seems obvious that it is advisable to modulate universalism according to the specific characteristics of empirical contexts. If not, the pompous, ostensibly discourse about ‘individual rights’ and “universalism” will obscure democracies that are heavily biased in favour of the particularisms of the majority. These are likely to be

democracies that are poorly established in normative terms, and even more poorly implemented institutionally. In Kant and Berlin's terms, they will be democracies that are too 'straight' to adequately regulate the human complexity of the different kinds of pluralism which coexist within them.

I) Do we interpret political and social reality correctly? Two analytical distortions.

The classical Greeks condensed the different characteristics of human beings in the myth of Prometheus and Zeus – depicted in Plato's *Protagoras* dialogue.¹ The gods gave the brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus the task of distributing abilities among the animals and human beings so that they could improve their lives. Epimetheus asked to be allowed to carry out this distribution. To some he gave strength, to others speed or wings with which to flee, in such a way that no species ran the risk of being wiped out. When he had distributed all the abilities, human beings had yet to receive theirs and this was the day that the gods' assignment expired. Prometheus, in his haste to find some form of protection for the human species, stole fire and professional wisdom from Hephaestus and Athena (for which he was subsequently punished). Humans thus possessed these abilities, but still lacked the 'political science' of coexistence, as this belonged to Zeus. Humans perfected their technologies, but fought amongst themselves whenever they met. Fearing that the human species would die out, Zeus sent Hermes to 'take morality and justice to humans, so that there would be order in the towns'.

Judging from the development of humanity, it would appear that, regarding the amounts of each type of knowledge distributed, Prometheus was significantly more generous than Zeus. We are better at technology than politics and justice. This myth illustrates very well that we humans are prone to act hastily and to improvise. Nowadays, we know this to be true thanks to studies into the evolution of life on the planet. Evolution is not based on a plan; it is the selection of a set of chance improvisations which have turned out to be adaptive. But what in Western culture appears to have been difficult to assimilate since Plato's time is that the thing that most *distinguishes* us from other species – language and technology – does not coincide with that which most *characterises* us as a species in evolution.

On the other hand, we know that political ideologies, when they are adopted unilaterally, distort reality. But together with these ideological distortions are others of which we are less aware: those associated with how we think, how we use language when we attempt to analyse and intervene in the world. Let us look at two of them.

A) The tendency to use extremely abstract categories in order to include the maximum number of cases of reality. In some way this is inevitable. Naming something involves creating an abstraction. But at times we lean towards what we might call the *fallacy of*

abstraction: believing that we understand a phenomenon better the more abstract is the language we use to describe it, explain it or transform it. And what often occurs is exactly the opposite: the more abstract the language, the poorer and further away it is from the empirical cases to which it is attempting to refer.¹

B) The tendency of Western thought to deal inadequately with pluralism. Today we recognise that (social, cultural, national, linguistic, religious, ideological, etc) pluralism is not only an insurmountable fact, but also an essential value. We know that when faced with any given situation there is not only *one* way to act correctly in moral terms; and it is also commonly agreed that there is not a single appropriate political decision in a specific moment or context. There are almost always several options which are equally reasonable. But in the history of Western philosophy a different approach has been taken. We have thought more in ‘monist’ than in ‘pluralist’ terms. Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin pointed out that a lack of pluralism has run through Western thought since Plato. And despite the fact that we recognise the existence and/or advisability of comparable value pluralism and lifestyles in contemporary societies, we often persist in believing that there is only one correct practical answer and that all the others are wrong.

Abstract and monist distortions are present in the majority of classic political conceptions. These distortions contribute to the fact that the world of theories of justice and democracy continues to be too ‘straight’, when the *timber* of humanity and societies is not. This question has caused and still causes both ethical injustices and institutional dysfunctions in liberal democracies. This is somewhat surprising with regard to a large part of the liberal-democratic tradition since one of its strong points is the defence of

pluralism, now understood as a value worth defending, rather than a mere fact with which it is necessary to coexist in the least harmful way possible.

However much it is repeated, it will never be possible to stress sufficiently the historic change which this tradition has meant for the ethical and functional improvement of the political organisation of a large part of humanity. Nevertheless, we know that this is a process that also displays a number of its own theoretical shadows and practical totalitarian versions. One of the keys to better thought and action lies in achieving a critical control over that pair of distortions – abstraction and monism – that dwell in our discourses. Doing so is not always easy; it requires intellectual effort and empirical sensitivity, but is necessary in order to refine both our analytical capabilities and our moral and political actions.

2 Twelve elements for a political and moral refinement of plurinational liberal democracies

1. In general terms, two intellectual attitudes are necessary in order to approach the subject of national pluralism (and multiculturalism): 1) to approach it as a practical problem, the aim of which is to avoid conflicts in the least traumatic and costly way possible (pragmatic approach), or 2) to approach it as a question of ‘justice’ in the relations between permanent majorities and minorities in democracies which require correct solutions (moral approach). A mixture of both approaches is commonly in use in practical politics. While the former is part of the political negotiation between actors, the second is present in the discourse of these actors’ legitimising processes. In plurinational societies, differences are apparent between national collectives regarding the parameters of national and cultural justice (unlike the intra-communitarian parameters with regard to socio-economic distributive justice – which are also plural, albeit more uniform, between national collectives).ⁱ

2. We know that the vast majority of human beings are culturally rooted, and it could be said that all cultures have value and that, in principle, all deserve to be respected. This does not imply that they cannot be compared in specific areas, that they are all equivalent and equally successful in these areas, that everything is morally acceptable, that there are no mutual influences, or that elements of several cultures cannot be shared. Or that one is unable to disengage oneself from one’s original culture.

3. Today, *cultural and national liberty* is an essential value for the *democratic quality* of a society. It is a kind of liberty – one of the human rights – that is crucial for an individual’s development and self-esteem and that, like all the other normative objectives of democracies, is limited by other values and other democratic liberties (*Human Development Report*, United Nations 2004).ⁱ One of the conclusions of the debate of recent years is, as mentioned above, that cultural and national liberty is not ensured through the mere application of the civil, participatory and social rights usually included in liberal-democratic constitutions at the beginning of the 21st century.

4. In the academic world it seems to be generally accepted that cultural and national issues are not simply ‘social causes’. The sphere of ‘cultural and national justice’ is different from the sphere of ‘socio-economic justice’. It is true that there are sometimes interrelationships between these two spheres of justice, but the phenomena associated with each one of them are different. These phenomena include different values, objectives, actors, institutions, practices and also different policies. Some institutions and policies may improve the latter while hardly having any effect on the former. And vice versa. This shows the impossibility of equating the *paradigm of equality* (or of *redistribution* in socio-economic terms) with the *paradigm of difference* (or of

recognition in national and cultural terms).¹ Both kinds of consideration are part of a more inclusive vision of ‘justice’ in contexts of national pluralism.

5. Traditional theories of democracy – both in their more liberal and more republican versions – usually refer implicitly to concepts, values and experiences in societies which were originally much simpler than their modern-day counterparts. Nowadays there is a ‘new agenda’ of issues that can no longer be reduced to the central concepts and legitimising language of traditional liberal and republican approaches – individual rights, absence of discrimination before the law, citizenship and popular sovereignty, the public virtues of the republican tradition, etc. Demands for recognition and political and constitutional accommodation of minority nations have found a place on the political agenda and liberal democracies must find a response to them. Despite their differences, what these distinct cases have in common is the desire to maintain and reinforce a set of specific national characteristics in an increasingly globalised world. This is something that the habitual institutions, processes and policies of current liberal democracies fail to adequately guarantee.

6. Traditional political conceptions have tended to treat the internal national and cultural differences of democracies which did not coincide with those of the majority society as ‘particularist deviations’. Too often the practical response of many liberal democracies has been to promote the cultural and national assimilation of minorities in order to achieve their ‘political integration’. The practical consequence has been the subsumption and marginalisation of the internal national and cultural minorities of the state in the name of universalist versions of ‘freedom of citizenship’, ‘popular sovereignty’ (of the state) or even of ‘non-discrimination’ (of majorities with regard to the claims of minorities). Practically speaking, these versions have behaved in a highly unequalitarian, discriminatory and biased way in favour of the *particular* characteristics of the culturally and nationally hegemonic or majority groups of the state (which do not always coincide with the groups or sectors which are hegemonic in the socio-economic sphere). It is possible to detect the presence of a uniformising form of stateism, in national and cultural terms, which is the practical ‘hidden element’ of traditional

democratic liberalism in the regulation of the rights and duties of the ‘citizenry’. In reality, all states, including liberal-democratic ones, have been and continue to be agents of nationalism and nationalisation.

7. Traditional theories of democracy lack a theory of the *demos*. They offer no normative responses to questions like: who should constitute the *demos* of a democracy?, is there, or should there be, a single *demos* for each democracy?, which collectivity represents solidarity?, etc. Moreover, these theories have not developed a theory of legitimate borders. Furthermore, there are conceptual limits to the interpretation of legitimising values even on the part of current liberal-democratic

theories which are highly elaborate in other aspects (Rawls, Habermas) when they attempt to deal with the demands for recognition and political accommodation of movements for national and cultural pluralism of a territorial nature.ⁱ

8. The idea that the democratic state is a culturally ‘neutral’ entity is a liberal myth that few defend today, not even the majority of liberal authors situated within traditional liberalism – whose theoretical approach could be described as individualist, universalist and stateist. All states impose cultural and linguistic features on their citizens. Liberal-democratic states are no exception. In clear contrast with the versions that still defend a kind of laissez-faire approach to cultural matters, or the alleged moral superiority or modernity of values of the majority, experience shows that the state has not been, nor is,

nor can ever be, ‘neutral’ in cultural terms, and that there is no moral superiority whatever in having a greater amount of collective decision-making power.

9. Processes of state-building and nation-building do not coincide. Nowadays, national identities have shown themselves to be long-lasting and increasingly important – in contrast to some liberal and socialist approaches which, since the 19th century, have treated these identities as a passing, decadent phenomenon. Both state-building and nation-building processes have conditioned the evolution of federalism.ⁱ

10. In plurinational societies there will always be values, interests and identities of a, at least partially, competitive nature. It would appear to be counterproductive, from a practical perspective, as well as useless, from a theoretical one, to attempt to adopt a different approach to the issue through concepts like the existence of an allegedly ‘post-nationalist’ political stage or of a kind of ‘constitutional patriotism’ linked only with liberal-democratic values which ignore individuals’ national and cultural characteristics. These attempts are poorly equipped in empirical terms and, in practice, usually act as legitimising elements for the status quo.ⁱ

11. It is obvious that individual and collective ‘identities’ are not a fixed reality, but construct themselves and change over time. However, most of the collective elements that constitute the basic features of individual identity are given to us. In other words, we do not choose them. The belief that we are ‘autonomous individuals’ who choose our (national, ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc) identities is, to a great extent, another of the myths of traditional liberalism. These elements are not normally chosen; any choices we make are based on them.ⁱ

12. The political contexts in which individuals are socialised are often the result of historical processes that include both peaceful and violent elements – wars of annexation, exterminations, mass deportations, etc – which are sometimes at the root of modern-day struggles for the recognition and self-government of minority nations (and of some national minorities). In the majority of these analytical elements it is possible to verify the presence of the two theoretical distortions mentioned above – the fallacy of abstraction and the inability to deal adequately with pluralism. These distortions have a direct repercussion on the quality of our democracies, above all in the current conditions of increasing pluralism and globalisation.

As a result, the construction of increasingly refined liberal democracies in terms of *cultural and national pluralism* is one of the biggest challenges of the normative and institutional revision of contemporary democratic systems. Some of the questions to be answered would be: what implications does the regulation of national pluralism have in the sphere of symbols, institutions and self-government?; how should classic notions like representation, participation, citizenship and popular sovereignty be understood and defined in plurinational and increasingly globalised contexts?; what does accepting national pluralism mean in international society?